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Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

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# **NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL**

## **Monterey, California**



## **THESIS**

**AN ANALYSIS OF PERSONNEL CAREER DEVELOPMENT  
PRACTICES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES MARINE  
CORPS CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING FORCE**

by

Joe H. Morris

December 2002

Thesis Advisor:

Marshall Engelbeck

Associate Advisor:

David V. Lamm

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**AN ANALYSIS OF CAREER DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES WITHIN THE  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING FORCE**

Joe H. Morris  
Major, United States Marine Corps  
B.S., University of Florida, 1992

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL  
December 2002**

Author: Joe H. Morris

Approved by: Marshall Engelbeck  
Thesis Advisor

David V. Lamm  
Associate Advisor

Douglas A. Brook, Ph.D.  
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy

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## **ABSTRACT**

Increased operational tempo, workforce reductions, and demanding legislation are creating a challenging environment for enlisted personnel serving in the contingency contracting force. Each branch of the U.S. military has responded differently to these challenges. The United States Marine Corps is heavily dependent upon enlisted personnel who are assigned the 3044 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) to perform contingency contracting. This thesis explores the current environment, within which these contingency contracting Marines operate, and analyzes the affect this environment is having on their career development. The study begins with an examination of the historical development of contingency contracting, and a reviews Government commissions that called for reform, which resulted in the establishment of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). The research then describes the requirements levied against contracting personnel under DAWIA and how they affect the enlisted military personnel. With this framework in place the study then evaluates the resulting approach to utilizing enlisted personnel for contingency contracting within the Military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines). This evaluation focuses on the organizational structure, education opportunities, training, career development, and employment of enlisted personnel within each of these Military Services and how this understanding can improve the career development of 3044s.



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# **I. INTRODUCTION**

## **A. BACKGROUND**

The events of September 11<sup>th</sup> 2001 clearly indicate that the United States of America is entering a 21<sup>st</sup> Century that is fraught with peril, uncertainty and chaos unlike that experienced in previous centuries. This environment presents a unique challenge to the American military forces tasked with ensuring the safety of American interests abroad and those of the homeland. Continuing reductions in personnel strength, combined with increasing demand, has resulted in a military force that is asked to do more with less. Thinly spread around the globe and tasked with increasing commitments military personnel must become more efficient, more intelligent, and more resourceful than ever before.

A method of achieving these results that the military is becoming more and more dependent upon is contingency contracting. With fewer ships and aircraft to ferry supplies from the continental United States to an area of operations the military is increasingly reliant upon local sources for much of its support. This is true for military training exercises with foreign nations as well. In order to obtain this local support, contingency contracting personnel authorized to enter into contractual agreements on behalf of the United States Government, must be capable of deploying to the area of operations in order to draft and authorize the purchase of foreign supplies.

These contingency contracting personnel serving within the United States Marine Corps are especially important to the success of deployed Marine Forces. These Marines are normally deployed alone or in pairs for large operations and must carry a huge burden of responsibility for providing support that can mean life or death to Marines half a world from home while safeguarding the public funds they are entrusted with and ensuring they are utilized in a legal, ethical and efficient manner. How well these contracting Marines shoulder this burden depends upon many factors ranging from the training and education they receive to the support they are given while deployed.

This study will evaluate how well contingency contracting Marines are prepared to accomplish their mission given the environment they are faced with and the challenges

that confront them. The goal is to investigate possible ways to improve the personnel career development of these contingency contracting Marines, thereby improving their ability to provided support to deployed Marines. The ability to obtain desperately needed supplies that are reliable and economical is an invaluable asset to the commander of deployed Marines.

## **B. OBJECTIVES**

The primary purpose of this study is to review the current policies and organizational structure of the United States Marine Corps military contracting force and how they impact the career development of those Marines assigned to the force. Then an analysis will be made of the approach other Department of Defense organizations use to develop their contingency contracting force to determine the best practices currently being employed. Combined with data collected from literature reviews, personal interviews and survey questions, this study will attempt to analyze the strengths and weaknesses associated with the current Marine Corps approach to career development and assess its overall effectiveness. The data will then be analyzed to determine alternative means of improving career development within the contingency contracting force.

## **C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The following primary research question will be used to direct and guide the objectives of this study:

**What effect has the changing contingency contracting environment had on personnel career development within the United States Marine Corps contingency contracting force and how might career development policies and processes be improved?**

In order to fully answer this primary research question, additional areas must be examined and fully understood. To do so, the following secondary questions will be explored in this study:

- How is career development currently being addressed within the United States Marine Corps contingency contracting community?
- What can be learned from effective career development practices within other military organizations and or Department of Defense activities?

- What training and education issues are affecting contingency contracting personnel and their career opportunities?
- Should the personnel structure of Marine Corps contracting offices be changed to accommodate improved career development opportunities?
- What changes are necessary to improve personnel career development within the contingency contracting force?

#### **D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS**

The scope of this thesis will include a thorough review of the policies that guide the training, education and command structure of the enlisted Marines assigned to contingency contracting billets within the Marine Corps. The research will then turn to an in-depth analysis of the roles and responsibilities of the enlisted Marine contracting specialist. This will include a comparison of contracting duties expected of enlisted Marines while assigned to garrison contracting billets and those while assigned to the contingency contracting billets and how they interrelate to provide the contracting specialist the experience needed to perform his job.

Although the overall Marine Corps Contracting Force consists of officer, enlisted, and civilian Marines, this study will be limited to the enlisted community. Civilian Marines do not currently deploy in support of contingency operations – only the officers and enlisted deploy to support training or contingency exercises. The population of officers serving in contingency contracting billets is too restricted to be the basis of this study. The larger population of enlisted contingency contracting personnel is adequate to draw conclusions about how well Marine Corps personnel conduct contingency contracting. The study will, however, be further restricted to the three Force Service Support Groups (FSSGs) within the Marine Corps. With the exception of a few enlisted Marines serving in joint command billets, the majority of contingency contracting Marines that are available to deploy in support of contingencies or exercises are located within one of these three FSSGs. There have been situations where Marines assigned to garrison billets have been deployed to support operations, however, this is rare and heavily dependent upon the qualifications of the individual Marine and the ability of the garrison commander to cover that Marine's responsibilities while he is gone.

This study is based upon several assumptions that are required to support the validity of this study's purpose of improving career development within the Marine

Corps contingency contracting force. First, it is assumed that the operational tempo experienced by the Marine Corps will continue into the indefinite future. Further it is assumed that this operational tempo will continue to demand the participation of Marine Corps contingency contracting personnel in support of deployed forces that is comparable to current requirements.

A subsequent assumption is that the Marine Corps will be able and willing to implement any changes to current policy proposed by this thesis. Changes to current force structure, implementations of innovative solutions and proponents within leadership willing to try innovative solutions make this a window of opportunity ripe for improved practices to bear fruit.

## **E. LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY**

The methodology used in this research began with a thorough literature review of books, magazine articles, studies, journals, policies, Marine Corps Orders and Directives, Marine Corps Doctrine and other resources that deal with the subject of Marine Corps contracting in general. From there, the research narrowed and focused on the specific literature that deals with the enlisted contingency contracting personnel and how they are trained, educated and assigned. Once a thorough understanding of the environment within which enlisted contingency contracting Marines serve was obtained, the researcher then turned to a literature review of contingency contracting guidance used by other U.S. Military Services.

Interviews were conducted with current and former Marine Corps contracting personnel and representatives from the customers they serve to ferret out problems, issues and challenges faced by the Marine Corps enlisted contingency contracting force. Interviews were also conducted as needed to clarify the approach to contingency contracting used by the other Military Services. The interview questions were tailored to the situation in order to clarify the understanding of how the guidelines established in the documents examined are actually implemented.

Concurrent with the interviews, a survey was conducted to determine how the attitudes of the contingency contracting Marines currently serving in those billets are being affected by the implementation of current policies, and their reactions to proposed

changes to them. Survey questions were designed to elicit perceived problems and recommendations for improvement from those closest to the issues. The web-based survey attempted to capture responses from as many individuals as possible that are currently in the 3044 MOS.

## **F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

### **1. Contingency**

A contingency is an event that requires the deployment of military forces in response to natural disasters, terrorist or subversive activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or military operations. Contingencies require plans for rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations and equipment. For contracting purposes, contingencies result from the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) declaring a particular mission or crisis a contingency, or when the President initiates select Reserve personnel call-ups specified in Public Law.

### **2. Contingency Contracting**

Contingency contracting is the process by which essential supplies and services needed to sustain deployed forces are obtained on behalf of the US Government. It includes emergency contracting in the continental United States (CONUS) or outside the continental United States (OCONUS) for those actions necessary to support mobilizing and deploying units.

### **3. Contracting**

Contracting is purchasing, renting, leasing or otherwise obtaining required goods and services from commercial sources. Contracting functions include preparing descriptions of required supplies and services, selection and soliciting sources, preparing and awarding contracts, and all aspects of contract administration. It does not include making grants or cooperative agreements. [Ref 1]

## **G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY**

This research is comprised of six chapters covering the following subject areas:

Chapter I established the rationale, limitations, and objectives behind why this study was undertaken and the goals it aims to achieve.

Chapter II contains background information on the policies and processes that guide the contingency contracting force within the Marine Corps. It is composed of three sections that explored the history of contingency contracting, the reasons driving our reliance on deployed contracting support, and concludes with an examination of the evolution of the rules and regulations that govern contingency contracting. The historical perspective in this chapter includes items like overseas depot facilities that would not normally involve enlisted contingency contracting personnel because of their scope and complexity. They are included here to give the reader an appreciation of how diverse the items are that fall within the realm of providing goods and services to deployed forces during a contingency operation.

Chapter III presents the data collected by the researcher through literature reviews and personal interviews that describes how each of the Military Services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) approach the issue of enlisted contingency contracting personnel. The data contained in this chapter is primarily focused on how each Service selects, educates, trains, structures and employs its enlisted personnel.

Chapter IV contains the results of a survey conducted by the researcher that was administered to Marines currently serving in the contracting forces of the United States Marine Corps. This survey asked respondents questions regarding training, education, structure, and employment from their perspective.

Chapter IV contains an analysis of the data collected in Chapters II, III, and IV. This chapter identifies strengths and weaknesses within the approach each of the Military Services has taken toward contingency contracting.

Chapter V summarizes the research effort while providing conclusions and recommendations.

## **II. BACKGROUND**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

Entering into contractual arrangements with civilian organizations to support military operations, either in a garrison setting or in a deployed environment, is not a new concept for the American Military Forces. The subject of this study is contingency contracting. This universally accepted term describes the actions required to purchase support for military units engaged in operations that are deemed a contingency. The terms contingency and contracting have been defined in the definitions section of Chapter I. The roots of contingency contracting can be traced at least as far back as the campaigns of Alexander the Great who acquired supplies for his Army through purchases made in local markets in addition to those he acquired through force. [Ref 2] The genesis of American contingency contracting, however, can be found in this country's fight for independence. Since that time, contingency contracting has been a vital part of every major military operation embarked upon by United States Military Forces.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a historical perspective on the evolution of contingency contracting within the Department of Defense. Examples from selected periods throughout American military history will be used to develop an understanding of the military's continuing reliance upon contingency contracting and how it has changed over time. The chapter will then look at the forces that are driving this changing reliance. Finally, the chapter concludes with an examination of the Government-wide laws and regulations that govern the military personnel charged with conducting contingency contracting. This perspective will provide a backdrop to aid the reader's understanding of the current approach to contingency contracting developed in later chapters of this work.

### **B. EARLY CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING IN AMERICA**

#### **1. Revolutionary War**

The early development of contingency contracting to support American military operations can be traced all the way back to the founding of the United States and the Military Services created for its protection. To support General George Washington's Army during the American Revolutionary War, the Continental Congress levied upon



each colonial state a requirement to contribute subsistence items to support the Army's needs. The major problem that soon arose was a logistical one. The limited assets at the Army's disposal: wagons, horses, drivers, etc., were inadequate to transport these contributions of food and supplies from distant states to the men fighting on the front lines. It was Robert Morris, the Superintendent of Finance, who solved this dilemma. He developed a plan to sell food and supplies received from these distant states and use the proceeds to employ civilian contractors near the front to supply the Army with food and supplies purchased locally. Robert Morris can, therefore, be considered the father of American contingency contracting and his solution the initiation of the contingency contracting process that continues to this day. [Ref 3]

## **2. Civil War**

The use of contingency contracting during the American Civil War provided critical support ranging from civilian surgeons and nurses to telegraph operators. For example, a small military staff under the command of Brigadier General Daniel McCallum and a cadre of about 25,000 civilians was responsible for operating 2,100 miles of captured or constructed rail lines in direct support of Union field armies. [Ref 4] In fact, the only female Medal of Honor recipient was a civilian working under contract for the Union. Dr. Mary Edwards Walker served with the title "Contract Assistant Surgeon" for the Union Army during the Civil War. President Andrew Johnson awarded her the medal on 11 November 1865. Although the medal was rescinded by the War Department in 1917, President Jimmy Carter restored it posthumously in 1977. [Ref 5]

In addition, the Army Quartermasters became very successful at supplying rations to the Union Army. Their approach was to contract with businessmen known as Sutlers. These individuals would follow the Union forces and procure rations from local merchants or producers and then sell them to the Army. Although some of these Sutlers were less than scrupulous and took advantage of their Army patrons, they were very instrumental in supplying rations to the Army and reduced the ancient practice of field armies foraging on the local surroundings. [Ref 6]

## **C. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING OVERSEAS**

### **1. World War I**

During World War I, the American military found itself using large quantities of contracted support outside the geographical boundaries of the continental United States. The stagnant trench-warfare being waged in Europe consumed vast quantities of food, ammunition, clothing, and all other manner of supplies and services. To keep up with this demand, the military turned again to contracting with civilians to support its needs. The following diverse examples indicate how widespread the use of contracting was during this war. The Army Transport Service managed 1,000 miles of French railroads and employed 2,200 French civilian crewmen as well as U.S. railroad troops. Engineers employed in France peaked at 34,000 civilians working on base construction, depots, ports, and roads. Throughout the war, members of the Army's Service of Supply (SOS) branch administered contracts with local civilians to provide this desperately needed support. [Ref 4]

### **2. World War II**

American participation in World War II utilized contingency contracting as well. to provide goods and services. Military forces from the United States were again fighting in Europe. In addition, the military found itself fighting on a second front in the Pacific Ocean, half a world away from the battles being waged in Europe. To compound the problems associated with this "two-front" war the rapid technological changes that were beginning to affect the battlefield in the First World War escalated sharply as the use of aviation and mechanized forces greatly increased the amount of material support required for the military forces. This increased reliance on technology demanded a correspondingly higher level of contract actions. For example, a large proportion of this increase in contracting resulted from employing 1,706 ocean going ships and 33, 846 civilian seaman. In addition, the increased complexity of Army equipment caused the Army to contract for things such as maintenance and land based transportation. As for maintenance, when the Army ran short of critical tank engines in 1944 a contract was negotiated with the French firm Gnome-Rhone to rebuild 252 Sherman tank engines and contracted repair of combat vehicles peaked at 800 per month in 1945. [Ref 4]

## **D. COLD WAR ERA**

### **1. Korea and Vietnam**

The use of contingency contracting continued during the Korean War with the first use of commercial aircraft to transport military personnel to the war-torn country. Additionally, the U.S. Military employed over 10,000 Korean and Japanese civilians to work port operations at Pusan. The long distance from America to Korea presented a problem for military equipment need major maintenance work. To solve this dilemma the U.S. Military employed over 42,000 Japanese and 300 American civilians to perform maintenance in depots located in Japan. The U.S. Government estimates that it saved \$9.5 billion by not returning equipment to the U.S. Records show that by 1952, 60 percent of the artillery, 71 percent of the infantry weapons, and 41 percent of the tanks used in Korea were cycled through depot centers in Japan. The U.S. Military even used 50,000 civilian porters from the native population of Korea to carry supplies for the Army [Ref 4]

The trend to use civilian aircraft to transport military personnel continued during the Viet Nam War as 90 percent of the troops and 28 percent of the supplies used in the war utilized commercially contracted air services. Since the concept of operations used by the U.S. Forces relied upon patrols sent out from base camps, base construction and facilities support was heavily reliant on civilian contractors. During the buildup phase of 1966 about 51,000 civilians were used on all the engineering projects completed. The use of overseas depots continued during Viet Nam as over 50 percent of the direct support for helicopter maintenance came from civilian contractors, and civilian-operated depots rebuilt combat and other vehicles in Japan and Okinawa. [Ref 4]

### **2. Persian Gulf War**

During the Persian Gulf War, the General Accounting Office (GAO) estimates that, in addition to the 5,000 U.S. Government civilians, there were 9,200 contracted employees deployed in support of U.S. Forces providing maintenance for high-tech equipment in addition to water, food, construction, and other services. [Ref 7] Of this number, 969 were representing 76 different U.S. Contractors. These civilian contractors deployed at about the same time as the military forces and a few of them even went into Iraq and Kuwait with the combat elements. [Ref 8]

## **E. POST COLD WAR**

### **1. Somalia**

To support Operations Restore Hope and Continue Hope in the country of Somalia the U.S. Army used its new Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) to award a Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) contract to Brown and Root Services Corporation. This program was developed to meet the challenges of “downsized” military. The contract was initially for one year with four one-year renewal options. The following benefits are touted as the results of using the program:

- Expanded Lift Capability. Civilian transportation assets can be used to the fullest extent allowing more efficient use of military transportation
- Flexibility. Logistics assets can be added or subtracted as needed
- Cost effectiveness. The price paid the contractor is less than similar services would cost for the military to provide
- Economy of Force. Military manpower can be better used for combat and other critical tasks [Ref 9]

Under this contract arrangement, Brown and Root Services earned \$62 million for building and maintaining Army base camps. This support was provided to all the military units operating in the country. [Ref 10]

### **2. Haiti**

In September 1994, U.S. troops were deployed to Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy. The Army’s LOGCAP contract with Brown and Root Services was again put into action. Initially these contractors were used to supplement military supply sources and then assumed the majority of the logistics operations for military units in Haiti. This peacekeeping operation marked the first time the Defense Logistics Agency employed a Contingency Support Team (CST) to support a contingency. Within 60 days, 500 Brown and Root personnel were supporting 15,000 soldiers by supplying more than 150,000 gallons of potable water, 40,000 gallons of fuel, 8,000 bundles of laundry, built 29 shower units and 29 dinning facilities, and filled over 200 supply requests for items ranging from paper plates to plywood. [Ref 11] Just two years after Somalia, Brown and Root Services was able to double its Somalia earnings, making \$133 million for building and supporting military bases in Haiti. [Ref 10]

### **3. Bosnia**

The Pentagon estimated that about 600 civilians and 1,400 contractors were initially deployed to Bosnia to support 22,000 troops conducting peacekeeping missions in that area. [Ref 12] Here in the Balkans the military's increasing reliance on contingency contracting for logistical support can be seen in the rising expenditures on contract support during the military operations in Bosnia. From December 1995, through May 1997, the Army expended \$546.6 million for contracted services. Due to the extended time troops were in the region, an additional contract with a value of \$413.5 million was issued to Brown and Root to cover the period from May 1997 to May of 1999. The expenditures then rose quickly to \$625 million for the one-year period from May 1999 to April 2000. [Ref 13]

#### **F. RATIO OF CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS TO MILITARY PERSONNEL**

An alternative method of determining how reliant the military forces are on contingency contracting to support military operations is to look at the ratio of contracted civilians to military personnel deployed to the conflict area. This ratio was approximately 1:6 civilians to combatants during the Revolutionary War. Except for World War I when the ratio reached 1:20 and the Korean War when it fell to 1:2.5, the ratio remained approximately 1:6. [Ref 4]

During the Persian Gulf War the ratio increased sharply to 1:50. [Ref 14] Following the Persian Gulf War the ratio has been steadily declining. It reached 1:30 during operations in Haiti where 500 Civilians working for Brown and Root Services were supporting 15,000 military personnel. [Ref 11] The ratio fell to 1:10 during the initial operations in Bosnia. [Ref 14] Recent articles indicate that the ratio of civilians to military personnel may currently be close to 2.5:1 in the Balkans. [Ref 10]

These changing ratios are summarized in Table 1. This table does not include information pertaining to current operations being conducted in support of the War on Terrorism, but indications from personnel returning from there indicate that civilian contractors continue to be employed by the military forces operating in areas near Afghanistan and Pakistan. [Ref 15] Table 1 was initially developed by Major William Epley, but has been modified to reflect recent information from conflicts that occurred after Major Epley developed it. [Ref 4]

CONFLICT	RATIO OF CIVILIANS TO SOLDIERS
Revolutionary War	1:6
Civil War	1:5
World War I	1:20
World War II	1:6
Korean Conflict	1:2.5
Vietnam Conflict	1:6
Persian Gulf War	1:50
Haiti	1:30
Bosnia	1:10

Table 1. Civilian to Combatant Ratio After: [Ref 4]

#### **G. TRENDS DRIVING THE INCREASED RELIANCE ON CONTRACTING**

With an historical perspective on the time honored tradition of contingency contracting in support of deployed military personnel, this chapter turns to an examination of the trends that are driving the military's escalating reliance on contingency contracting. Although the following trends are not all inclusive, they indicate that multiple forces are at work making the use of civilian contractors more attractive to the military.

##### **1. Reduction in Military Personnel Structure**

The most obvious reason for the military embracing contingency contracting is the military "downsizing" of the 1990's. Since the end of the Cold War, active duty military forces have been reduced by 700,000 positions. In addition, more than 300,000 Department of Defense civilian positions have been eliminated. [Ref 14] This equates to a 30 percent loss in manpower across the spectrum of Military Services over the last 15 years. All branches of the Service have reduced the size of their forces from their strength at the height of the Persian Gulf War. [Ref 16]

These reductions have created an imbalance between the number of actual combatants that can be fielded and the number of non-combatant personnel required to support these war fighters. The term that has been commonly used to refer to this imbalance is the “tooth-to-tail” ratio. The “tooth” refers to the combat power of the American military and the “tail” is a reference to the support forces that ensure combat power can be applied and sustained as needed. This was such a concern to Secretary of Defense William Cohen that he instituted the Tooth-to-Tail Commission to find ways to reduce the tail portion of the defense budget. The Commission found that this ratio was close to 50:50 trigger pullers to support personnel, but had grown to nearly 70% tail currently. In fact, some DoD statistics indicate that only 14 percent of the 2.5 million members of the Armed Services are officially listed in combat positions. [Ref 17]

The mandated ceilings on personnel end strength and the increased number of support personnel has created a situation where Army commanders, for instance, rob deploying units of their personnel and equipment to support units deployed to operations in Bosnia, Haiti, and other regions. [Ref 18] This author likewise experienced similar personnel juggling to support deployments while serving as the S-4 Officer for 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 6<sup>th</sup> Marine Regiment, 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division from 1993 until 1996.

## **2. Reductions in Fiscal Structure**

Closely correlated to and partially driving the reduced manpower levels indicated above is the reduced level of the Defense Budget, which has been reduced by 40 per cent in real terms. The DoD portion of the budget has shifted significantly over the past 30 years. In 1962, the defense portion of the budget was 9.3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Except for a spike to 9.4 percent during the Vietnam War, it continues to decline. Office of Management and Budget (OMB) records indicate that the current defense budget is 3.3 percent of GDP. [Ref 17]

Reduced funding has prompted a number of initiatives within DoD to limit expenses and free up support funds that can be used to maximize the use of scarce resources. As a result, the military has begun evaluating what its “core competencies” are and doing cost benefit analysis and best value comparisons to determine which functions it should continue to be organic capabilities and which functions can be outsourced. Part of this analysis requires an evaluation of the cost of contractor support compared to the

cost required to train and retain military personnel capable of performing a given function.

### **3. Cost of Contractor Support Compared to Military Personnel Costs**

The efforts to determine if the cost of using contracted labor versus military personnel is getting a lot of attention due to the large amounts of some of the contracts being issued. The Navy and the Marine Corps are in the process of converting their computer support needs to a completely contracted venture. The Navy and Marine Corps Intranet, or NMCI, program works under what is called a “seat management” concept. This concept requires the civilian organization to provide a certain number of computer seats that are maintained and updated completely by contracted civilians. This service contract will allow the Navy and the Marine Corps to reduce significantly the number of personnel they have devoted to Information Technology. This program has just been increase by \$1.96 billion to a total cost of \$8.8 billion for seven years with 3 option years. [Ref 19]

In spite of enormous price tags such as the one for NMCI, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Outsourcing and Privatization estimated savings of up to \$7 billion to \$12 billion annually by the end of FY 2002. [Ref 20] In addition to reducing expenditures, outsourcing can present savings in personnel numbers as well. The high price tags for support prompted the Logistics Management Institute to conduct an examination of the contracted logistics support in Bosnia. The Institute estimated that it would have taken 8,900 support troops to provide the same service that Brown and Root Services provided with 6,700 employees. Part of these savings came as a result of using local nationals to perform many of the labor-intensive support items. These local nationals are less expensive than the cost of a military member. [Ref 13]]

### **4. Increased Operational Tempo**

Since 1990, the pace of military operations has grown tremendously, making it difficult to maintain combat training schedules for units at the company level and above. An alarming turnover ratio has also compounded the problem. In the Air Force, for instance, on any given day 12,000 airmen are deployed, compared with only about 2,000 before the Persian Gulf War. In the years between 1982 and 1989, the Marines were



involved in 15 contingency operations; since 1989, they have participated in 62 such operations. [Ref 18]

The Army, likewise, has experienced a 300 percent increase in mission commitments during the past several years, and they do not appear to be tapering off. [Ref 21] In fact, the U.S. Army has deployed troops on 36 occasions compared to 10 deployments during the 40-year Cold War. The National Guard and the Armed Forces Reserves are performing 13 times the man-days of service per year than they contributed prior to the fall of the Soviet Union. [Ref 7]

#### **5. Limited Military Presence**

The increased operational tempo discussed above has been driven by U.S. involvement in multinational peacekeeping operations throughout the world. Political constraints in these areas limit the number of troops that can be deployed to support the mission. As a result, the Army has relied heavily on the use of contractors to provide support operations, normally done by soldiers. The use of non-combatants that do not count against the force totals permit the Army to maximize their combat troops in the area of operations while still remaining within the constraints mandated by the authority over the military. Former President Bill Clinton was keenly aware of this when he promised to limit to 20,000 the number of troops deployed to Bosnia. [Ref 12]

#### **6. Additional Political Benefits**

In addition to maximizing combat troops added benefits can be found in the use of local nationals to fill in for the shortage of support troops. During Operation Joint Endeavor, the government of Hungary would not allow the civilian contractor, providing support to the military operations there, to bring employees into their country since it was not part of the omnibus agreement. The Hungarian government was eventually persuaded to allow these employees access after it received assurances that a large portion of Brown and Root Services' work force would include Hungarians. [Ref 22]

When local civilians are hired, contractor support becomes a vehicle for putting hard-pressed local nationals back to work in a depressed economy. Vital skills that may have been lost for a generation can be taught to young people and thus infused into a suffering society. The use of contracted goods and services can rejuvenate the local

economy as in Bosnia where it became a pillar in the commanding general's strategic campaign. [Ref 23]

Government initiatives of this nature, infusing American funds into a depressed local economy, foster a favorable impression of the U.S. military's presence in a foreign country. In addition, the reduced number of military troops deployed to a ravaged country reduced the perception that the country is being occupied. [Ref 13]

#### **7. High-Technology Weapon Systems**

The environment has changed considerably since DoD Directive 1130.2, Management and Control for Engineering and Technical Services, was published. That document required the military to maintain technicians capable of supporting vital military systems. Today, that document is gone and the philosophy that generated it has been revised. Continual and rapid technological change has made it uneconomical to keep military personnel capable of maintaining and troubleshooting sophisticated weapons. [Ref 14]

As an example, General Dynamics Services Company had more than 100 employees in Saudi Arabia prior to the start of Operation Desert Storm, the majority of them supporting the maintenance contract the Army had for its family of wheeled and tracked vehicles. [Ref 24]

The Office of the Inspector General also indicated that reliance on contractor support is primarily attributable to the increased technical complexity of weapons and other defense systems resulting from the Military Departments' force modernization efforts. In addition, the perceived need to put into operation new systems before adequately trained military technicians are available is increasing the need to have contractors near the front. [Ref 25]

#### **8. Reduced Infrastructure Overseas**

The continued reduction in U.S. force structure has resulted in a number of base closures overseas and diminished troop strength in forward deployed locations. With the loss of this infrastructure overseas, organic support would have to be deployed from the continental United States to the area of operations. Theater support contractors provide

an in-place capability that does not have to be deployed. This saves time and effort during deployment operations. [Ref 5]

An example of how much of the overseas infrastructure that has been reduced can be found in the Army's reduction in deployed personnel in Europe. Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, there were more than 200,000 soldiers based in Europe. Today, there are fewer than 60,000 U.S. troops in Europe. [Ref 18]

## **H. EVOLVING CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING REGULATIONS**

The reader should now have a mental framework of how the use of contingency contracting has evolved throughout the history of the United States, as well as an understanding of some of the multitude of forces that are propelling a continued reliance upon contingency contracting. This chapter concludes with an examination of the rules and regulations that have been established in an effort to standardize contingency contracting procedures and the concerns that prompted them.

### **1. The Call for Reform**

Although Government regulations pertaining to contracting have been around since the Revolutionary War, the roots of contemporary contracting within the Department of Defense effectively began with the end of the Second World War. During that war the nation's economy was completely immersed in the production of war materials. When it ended however, the reduction in military forces called into question many of the contracts the Government had needed to support the war. Under the scrutiny of DoD contracts the contracting process itself began to be questioned. Concerns began to arise not just over what the Government was contracting for, but how it was conducting the contracting process. These concerns initiated a series of commissions that were established during the 50-year Cold War era to study the contracting process with DoD. Many of these commissions identified weaknesses within the Executive Branch's Department of Defense and called for changes or "reform" in the Department of Defense acquisition community. [Ref 27]

Some of the comments generated by these commissions regarding the professionalism of the Government acquisition process are listed below:

This failure is reflected further in the personnel system, which does not provide competent staff to fill supply positions. Although purchasing is a

highly skilled profession that requires intimate knowledge of trade conditions and markets, Government agencies are inadequate to recruit and keep persons with the required professional competence, personnel processes fail to make proper acknowledgement of the skills required. [Ref 28]

The Secretary of Defense should establish a policy requiring each military department to develop and assign career -trained personnel to technical and executive posts throughout the field of procurement management. [Ref 29]

The promotion and rotation system of the Military Services do not facilitate career development in the technical and professional activities such as research and development, procurement, intelligence, communications and automatic data processing. [Ref 30]

The commission recognized that although procurement was not yet a profession, the increasing complexity and importance of the procurement process demand a more competent and professional workforce. [Ref 31]

Chances for meaningful improvement will come not from mere regulation but only with major institutional change. Common sense must be made to prevail alike in the enactments of Congress and the operations of the Department. We must give acquisition personnel more authority to do their jobs. [Ref 32]

It is clear that there is no lack of statutory, Executive Order and outside expert identification of problems and recommended changes that should be pursued to improve the quality and professionalism of the acquisition workforce. Yet despite the obvious changes made in the recent past, few are convinced that enough has been done. New and varied proposals to change the organization or character of the acquisition workforce have been espoused with increasing efficiency. [Ref 33]

The chart in Table 2 was created by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen V. Reeves for his Executive Research Project, “The Ghosts of Acquisition Reform: Past, Present and Future.” In his study he clearly identifies a recurring finding of these commissions that the acquisition workforce needed “professional development [Ref 34]

<b>Commission</b>	<b>Who is in Charge</b>	<b>Process Inefficiency</b>	<b>Need for “Business Practice?”</b>	<b>Public v. Private Sectors</b>	<b>Acquisition Workforce</b>
Hoover I, 1949	Centralize all acquisition under DoD	Excess costs, waste	Yes		
Rockefeller Committee, 1953	Centralize all acquisition under DoD	Excess costs, waste and fraud	Yes		
Hoover II, 1953	Centralize all acquisition under DoD	Excess costs, waste	Yes	Reduce/eliminate arsenal system	
McNamara Initiatives, 1961	Centralize all acquisition under DoD	Establish PPBS to control costs	Yes, Increased analysis		
Fitzhugh Commission, 1970	Decentralize. SecDef span of control too great.	Too much oversight-especially congress	Yes		Requires professional development
Commission on Gov’t Procurement, 1972	Centralize all acquisition under DoD	“Streamline” procurements through reducing regs.	Yes		Requires professional development
Grace Commission, 1983	Centralize all acquisition under DoD	Eliminate fraud, waste and abuse	Yes		
Packard Commission, 1985	Decentralize, Sec Def span of control too great	Consolidate procurement regulations	Yes	Increase use of commercial products	Requires professional development
Defense Mgt Review, 1989	Centralize all acquisition under DoD	Eliminate fraud, waste and abuse	Yes	Increase use of commercial products	
Section 800 Panel, 1993		Consolidate procurement regulations	Yes	Increase use of commercial products	
National Performance Review, 1993	Centralize policy, decentralized execution	Consolidate procurement regulations	Yes	Increase use of commercial products	Requires professional development

Table 2. Acquisition Reform Initiatives and their Findings From: [Ref 34]

## **2. Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)**

Attempts were made throughout this 50-year period to improve the acquisition process, yet substantial changes were not aimed at the Acquisition Workforce until the implementation of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) in 1990. This Act became Section 1202, "Defense Acquisition Workforce", of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991. Congressional passage of this authorization act added DAWIA to Public Law 101-510 of 1990, which amended Title 10 United States Code by incorporating its provisions as chapter 87 of Subtitle A "Armed Forces". This first draft of Chapter 87 levied requirements upon the Defense Department in five broad categories or subchapters: General Authorities and Responsibilities, Defense Acquisition Positions, Acquisition Corps, Education and Training, and General Management Provisions. The subchapter of particular note to this study is Subchapter II Defense Acquisition Positions. This subchapter established the following qualification requirements, under Section 1724, for contracting officers within the military:

`(a) CONTRACTING OFFICERS - The Secretary of Defense shall require that, beginning on October 1, 1993, in order to qualify to serve in an acquisition position as a contracting officer with authority to award or administer contracts for amounts above the small purchase threshold referred to in section 2304(g) of this title, a person must (except as provided in subsections (c) and (d))--

`(1) have completed all mandatory contracting courses required for a contracting officer at the grade level, or in the position within the grade of the General Schedule (in the case of an employee), that the person is serving in;

`(2) have at least two years of experience in a contracting position;

`(3)(A) have received a baccalaureate degree from an accredited educational institution authorized to grant baccalaureate degrees, (B) have completed at least 24 semester credit hours (or the equivalent) of study from an accredited institution of higher education in any of the following disciplines: accounting, business finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, and organization and management, or (C) have passed an examination considered by the Secretary of Defense to demonstrate skills, knowledge, or abilities comparable to that of an individual who has completed at least 24 semester credit hours (or the equivalent) of study from an accredited

institution of higher education in any of the disciplines listed in subparagraph (B); and

`(4) meet such additional requirements, based on the dollar value and complexity of the contracts awarded or administered in the position, as may be established by the Secretary of Defense for the position. [Ref 35]

In addition, Section 1724 of Chapter 87 went on to establish the following qualification requirements for the civilian contracting personnel within the military community:

`(b) GS-1102 SERIES- The Secretary of Defense shall require that, beginning on October 1, 1993, a person may not be employed by the Department of Defense in the GS-1102 occupational series unless the person (except as provided in subsections (c) and (d)) meets the requirements set forth in subsection (a)(3).

`(c) EXCEPTIONS- (1) The requirements set forth in subsections (a)(3) and (b) shall not apply to any employee who, on October 1, 1991, has at least 10 years of experience in acquisition positions, in comparable positions in other government agencies or the private sector, or in similar positions in which an individual obtains experience directly relevant to the field of contracting.

`(2) The requirements of subsections (a) and (b) shall not apply to any employee for purposes of qualifying to serve in the position in which the employee is serving on October 1, 1993, or any other position in the same grade and involving the same level of responsibilities as the position in which the employee is serving on such date.

`(d) WAIVER- The acquisition career program board of a military department may waive any or all of the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) with respect to an employee of that military department if the board certifies that the employee possesses significant potential for advancement to levels of greater responsibility and authority, based on demonstrated job performance and qualifying experience. With respect to each waiver granted under this subsection, the board shall set forth in a written document the rationale for its decision to waive such requirements. The document shall be submitted to and retained by the Director of Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development. [Ref 35]

In essence, Section 1724 required commissioned officers and civilian GS-1102 contract specialists to 1) complete mandatory contracting classes, 2) meet prescribed experience levels, and 3) either have a 4-year college degree, 24 Semester credits in business coursework, or pass and equivalency exam. Noticeably absent from Section

1724 was any reference to the requirements for enlisted members of the military who were performing contracting actions similar in scope to the GS-1102. This policy, Chapter 87, remained in effect and unchanged until Section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001. This new Act made several amendments to the original version.

First, it amended paragraph 3 (A) by inserting the word “and” prior to (B) in that paragraph. This essentially removed the option of either having a baccalaureate degree or 24 semester credit hours of business related college courses and made them both a requirement. It also removed the possibility of taking an examination that demonstrated the skills expected of an individual with 24 semester credits of college. As a result all contracting officers and GS-1102 civilians, within the “Armed Forces”, are required to have a baccalaureate degree and 24 business credits.

Secondly, it changed paragraph (b) “GS-1102 Series” by including “and similar military positions” in the title. In effect, this change, which went into effect on October 1, 2000, required all military, including enlisted personnel, to meet the same education qualifications as GS-1102 civilians, who were already required to meet the same education requirements as the contracting officers. This requirement meant that military contracting personnel, of which, enlisted contingency contracting personnel were a subset, were required to have a baccalaureate degree to enter the workforce. One of the major requirements to be a commissioned officer in the armed forces is having a baccalaureate degree, however, most enlisted personnel tend not to have a baccalaureate degree. This meant that very few of the enlisted personnel performing contracting when Section 808 was implemented were in compliance with its contents, unless they already met the exclusions of the statute. [Ref 36]

The most recent amendments to Title 10, subtitle A, Chapter 87, Section 1724 gave military workforce members an additional avenue to comply with the statutory requirements to enter the contracting workforce. Section 824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 added a provision to Section 1724 for the Secretary to establish qualification requirements for the “Contingency Contracting Force”. This exception to the education requirements allows the military an opportunity



to qualify to enter the contracting career field with either 24 semester credit hours in business, or passing an examination that demonstrates the skills, knowledge or abilities comparable to an individual who has completed at least 24 business hours. The paragraph titled “Contingency Contracting Force” included below, essentially reduced the educational requirements for enlisted personnel, serving in the contingency contracting force, from a baccalaureate degree to just needing to meet the 24 semester hour credits of business related coursework, or pass an examination that demonstrates the abilities of someone with 24 hours of business college. To date, DoD is in the process of developing a policy memorandum directing each service to develop an “examination” to satisfy this requirement. [Ref 37]

“(f) CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING FORCE- The Secretary shall establish qualification requirements for the contingency contracting force consisting of members of the armed forces whose mission is to deploy in support of contingency operations and other operations of the Department of Defense, including—

“(1) completion of at least 24 semester credit hours or the equivalent of study from an accredited institution of higher education or similar educational institution in any of the disciplines of accounting, business, finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, or organization and management; or

“(2) passing an examination that demonstrates skills, knowledge, or abilities comparable to that of an individual who has completed at least 24 semester credit hours or the equivalent of study in any of the disciplines described in paragraph (1).”[Ref 37]

These recent changes in section 1724 of Chapter 87 are a clear response to the repeated comments in Table 2 that the DoD workforce required professional development. In spite of the exceptions listed above, congress clearly equates college level education with improved professionalism within the acquisition community.

In addition to the education and experience requirements, Section 1724 required contracting personnel to complete mandatory contracting courses for the grade level or position they are serving in. This was accomplished by adding Section 1205 “Defense Acquisition University Structure” to the Nation Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 1991. This section mandated that the Secretary of Defense to establish the Defense

Acquisition University no later than 1 October 1991. This university was directed to develop a training curriculum to instruct contracting personnel in uniform contracting procedures by establishing:

A coherent framework for the educational development of personnel in acquisition positions. Such framework shall cover courses of instruction from the basic level through intermediate and senior levels. [Ref 35]

### **3. DoD 5000.52M Acquisition Career Development**

The Secretary of Defense responded to DAWIA by issuing DoD Directive 5000.52 “Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development Program” on 25 October 1991. This directive implemented the workforce requirements mandated by Chapter 87 of Title 10 U.S.C. Subsequently, DoD 5000.52-M “Acquisition Career Development Program Manual” implemented the directive and gave explicit direction on how the Department of Defense would develop the necessary framework to achieve the standardization sought by congress. [Ref 38]

Essentially, the manual established three career levels of certification for members of the acquisition community. Corresponding training, experience, and education requirements were established for each level. The three levels established were: Level 1 (Basic or Entry), Level II (Intermediate or Journeyman), and Level III (Advanced or Senior). In addition, the manual requires each acquisition position to have a certification standard established for it. Personnel desiring to fill an acquisition position within DoD must meet the certification standards established for it. [Ref 38]

The mandatory certification requirements for contracting personnel at these 3 levels are listed in Table 3. Incumbent contracting personnel are required to meet the listed requirements for their position within 18 months of being assigned to that position. Personnel who fail to meet these requirements must request a waiver. [Ref 38]

Certification Level	I	II	III
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baccalaureate Degree</li> <li>• 24 Semester hours business related courses</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baccalaureate Degree</li> <li>• 24 Semester hours business related courses</li> <li>• Master's Degree (desired)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Baccalaureate Degree</li> <li>• 24 Semester hours business related courses</li> <li>• Master's Degree (desired)</li> </ul>
Experience	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 1 year contracting experience</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 2 years contracting experience</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 4 years contracting experience</li> </ul>
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CON 100</li> <li>• CON 101</li> <li>• CON 104</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CON 202</li> <li>• CON 204</li> <li>• CON 210</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• CON 301</li> <li>• CON 333</li> </ul>

Table 3. DAWIA Certification Requirements From: [Ref 39]

#### 4. Continuous Learning

In addition to the DAWIA requirements discussed above, members of the acquisition workforce are also required to achieve 80 continuous learning points within a two year period with a goal of achieving 40 points per fiscal year. This policy was established in 1998 Memorandum from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. The Under Secretary's response was partially due to the growing pressure to improve the professional development of the acquisition workforce, and partially due to the speed of change being experienced by the Acquisition community.

As we move to more sophisticated processes and empower acquisition employees to assume greater responsibility, it is imperative that we couple these increased demands on the workforce with the kinds of training, education, and professional development that will enable them to assume these new roles. Meeting increased performance expectations in the rapidly changing defense acquisition environment requires workforce members to be current with reforms, adaptable, flexible, and willing to accept risk and exercise leadership. [Ref 40]

This Memo established as a requirement that all members of the acquisition workforce attain at least 80 continuous learning points within a two-year period with the goal of 40 points during each fiscal year. These points are tracked by each military

department, and like the DAWIA certification rates , are reported to the Office of the Under Secretary annually. The point system for these continuous learning credits is listed in Table 4. These are only guidelines and supervisors have flexibility in assigning points. DAU does offer a lot of continuous learning courses, but additional funding is not provided for units to send personnel to this training.

CREDITABLE ACTIVITIES	POINT CREDIT (see note)
Academic Courses	
Quarter Hour	10 per Quarter Hour
Semester Hour	10 per Semester Hour
Continuing Education Unit (CEU)	10 per CEU
Equivalency Exams	Same points as awarded for the course
Training Courses/Modules	
DAU Courses/Modules	10 per CEU (see DAU catalog) or:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Awareness Briefing/Training—no testing/assessment associated</li> <li>Continuous Learning Modules—testing/assessment associated</li> </ul>	.5 point per hour of instruction 1 point per hour of instruction
Other Functional Training	1 point per hour of instruction
Leadership or Other Training	1 point per hour of instruction
Equivalency Exams	Same points as awarded for the course
Professional Activities	
Professional Exam/License/Certificate	10-30 points
Teaching/Lecturing	2 points per hour; maximum of 20 points per year
Symposia/Conference Presentations	2 points per hour; maximum of 20 points per year
Workshop Participation	1 point per hour; maximum of 8 points per day and 20 points per year
Symposia/Conference Attendance	.5 point per hour; maximum of 4 points per day and 20 points per year
Publications	10 to 40 points

Note - All activities may earn points only in the year accomplished, awarded or published.

Table 4. Continuous Learning Points From: [Ref 40]

One final note on training that bears on the contingency contracting force is an optional course given by DAU called “CON 234”. This course is specifically designed to educate Military members on contracting policies and procedures used while in a foreign country. Topics covered in this course include: waivers to DoD policies, exemptions from certain regulations, increased purchasing authorities, and cultural differences. These topics combine to create a unique environment that gives contracting personnel

increased authority, more responsibility, and for flexibility to support their mission than they would normally have when contracting in the garrison environment. [Ref 39]

## **I. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This chapter began with a thorough examination of the historical perspectives that led to the evolution of contingency contracting. The trend towards contingency contracting has been steadily moving forward since the founding of this country. The chapter then examined many of the reasons current literature reports as the drivers propelling this increasing reliance on contingency contracting to support the military deployments seen today. These two sections of chapter II were included to give a historical perspective to the study and to support the notion that contingency contracting will continue well into the foreseeable future. The reader should now have a basic understanding of what contingency contracting is, how it evolved in this country and how likely it is to continue to be a viable force multiplier in future military operations.

The last section of Chapter II examined several studies that have been conducted by various commissions and what their recommendations were regarding personnel development. Although these commissions had many wide-reaching recommendations involving almost every aspect of the department of defense, the information presented was specifically related to the weaknesses these commissions found in relation to personnel issues that resulted in the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA). This Act laid the groundwork for the current contingency contracting framework within the DoD, with an understanding of the historical and regulatory context of contingency contracting the following chapter evaluates how each of the military services has structured its response to these challenges.

### **III. DATA COLLECTION**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter begins with an examination of current Marine Corps policy governing the organization and employment of enlisted Marine contingency contracting personnel. This examination will include a brief exploration of the education, training, and career development of Marines within the 3044 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS). After examining the approach the Marine Corps has taken, the same issues will be evaluated within the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The goal here is to give the reader an understanding of how each Service deals with their particular need for contingency contracting.

#### **B. MARINE CORPS APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING**

##### **1. Organization of Contracting Force**

The contingency contracting force within the United States Marine Corps is organized to support the needs of deployed units of various sizes and is guided in this effort by Marine Corps Order 4200.15F, Marine Corps Purchasing Procedures Manual, Appendix B. The Marine Corps concept of employment calls for both enlisted and commissioned officers to perform the many varied missions expected of contingency contracting personnel. Unlike the Navy and the Army, the Marine Corps does not currently utilize its civilian contracting personnel to support contingency operations. [Ref 40] Appendix A lists all the commissioned contracting billets within the Marine Corps and Appendix B lists all the enlisted contracting billets within the Marine Corps.

There are currently 19 billets for Marine Corps commissioned contracting officers filled by Marine officers with the rank of Captain through Lieutenant Colonel. These officers have attended the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) and received a Master of Science degree in Management with an emphasis on contracting. Upon graduation from NPS these Marine officers are given the secondary MOS of 9656 and assigned to one of the available 19 billets for a 3-year “payback tour”. At the conclusion of their payback tour these officers return to their primary MOS and continue their career. Only a few are given an opportunity for a second tour in contracting. Of these 19 billets, only three are identified as “contingency contracting” billets, and are located at each of the three

Contingency Contracting Offices in the Supply Battalion of the Forces Service Support Groups (FSSGs). In addition, the Contingency Contracting Offices include eight enlisted 3044 Marines whose roles are to support contingency contracting operations. Since the 9656 Marine officers are outside the scope of this thesis, they are briefly mentioned to aid the reader in understanding how the Marine Corps Contingency Contracting Offices are structured and how Marines are employed within that structure. The relatively small number of 9656 officers means that generally most deployments for exercises or operations are supported by enlisted 3044s, while the 9656 are employed in large Joint or Marine Corps contingency operations and exercises. [Ref 41]

There are approximately 116 enlisted Marines who hold the 3044 MOS - all capable of deploying in support of contingency operations. However, the 24 Marines located at one of the three FSSGs are the only enlisted Marines considered to be in an immediate “deployable” status as operationally that is their role. The remaining 3044 MOS Marines within the Marine Corps are assigned to either a “base” or “staff” billet and are typically given responsibilities that prevent them from deploying. Therefore, when the need arises for a contingency contracting Marine to support a deployment that Marine will most likely come from one of the three FSSGs. All 3044s are capable of deploying. Once the 3044s in the Contingency Contracting Offices are exhausted, then the 3044s assigned to the RCOs are tapped. If the FSSGs are unable to support a contingency contracting personnel request, due to their limited number of Marines, that request can be filled by base Marines with the approval of their OIC or passed to another military Service for support. [Ref 42]

With the components of the Marine Corps contingency contracting force identified, this study now examines how these Marines fit into the organizational structure of the Marine Corps operating forces. The diagrams that follow begin with a broad view of Marine Corps organizational structure and then drill down through the layers that contain the Marine Corps contracting personnel and eventually end up with the contingency contracting personnel.

Figure 1 depicts the overall structure of a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) and its relationship to the Geographic Combatant Commander. The Marine Corps has three

Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF); I MEF, Camp Pendleton CA; II MEF, Camp Lejeune NC; and III MEF, Okinawa Japan. Figure 1 also depicts the way the Marine Corps task organizes its Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF) and includes the personnel strength devoted to military operations of various sizes.




Figure 1. Marine Corps Organizational Chart From: [Ref 43]

It is within the Force Service Support Group under the MEF that the contingency contracting Marines are located. Figure 2 depicts the basic organization of the FSSG. Since the function of the contingency contracting Marines is closely related to the job performed by the supply personnel within the FSSG, the 3044 Marines fall within the control of the Supply Battalion Commanding Officer.




Figure 2. Marine Corps Force Service Support Group From: [Ref 44]



Figure 3 shows a block diagram of the command structure for the Supply Battalion within the FSSG. It is at this point in the examination of the Marine Corps command structure that variations begin to appear in the chain of command for the 3044s assigned to each of the three Supply Battalions.




Figure 3. Supply Battalion Organization From: [Ref 44]

Although each of the FSSGs assign their 3044 Marines to the Supply Company within the Supply Battalions, the relationship between the contracting Marines and the Supply Company varies among the three FSSGs. The next section describes the differences found in the relationships each of the contingency contracting sections have with the Supply Company within the FSSG, and the local Regional Contracting Office (RCO) that provides in-garrison contracting support to the Base.

## **2. FSSG Relationship with the Regional Contracting Office**

Each of the three FSSG Contingency Contracting Offices are located aboard a Marine Corps Base. Also aboard each of these bases, is a Marine Corps Regional Contracting Office (RCO). Although the structure of each RCO is slightly different, in terms of its personnel, the basic configuration of an RCO consists of a 9656 officer or senior civilian in charge of approximately 12 contracting Marines (3044) and approximately 20 civilian contracting personnel. The civilians and Marines assigned to the RCO are responsible for all the contracting activity necessary to support base operations or Marine units within their geographic region. [Ref 42]

The relationship between the 1<sup>st</sup> FSSG Contingency Contracting Office and the RCO Southwest located at Camp Pendleton CA. can be characterized as one of beneficial cohabitation. The Contingency Contracting Office is co-located with the RCO. Contracting authority provided to the Contingency Contracting Office is for contracting actions while on deployment only. Thus, this symbiotic relationship affords an environment where the contingency contracting 3044s can exercise their contracting

skills on a regular basis. This arrangement between the two organizations permits the RCO to distribute assignments to the FSSG contracting Marines, and in turn provides valuable training that can be used while performing deployed contracting. Generally the scope and amount of work that can be assigned under this relationship is limited to small contracts that are usually short in duration that normally fall below the Simplified Acquisition Procedure (SAP) threshold or those under FAR 13.5, Commercial Items. This training is invaluable since the majority of purchases performed during contingency operations is accomplished under SAP or FAR 13.5. Ultimately, the FSSG retains total operational control over these Marines. If larger contracts were given to the FSSG Marines and they were given orders to deploy, the garrison contracts being administered by the FSSG Marines would suffer. This arrangement is, however, mutually beneficial to both parties. The FSSG Marines get training they would not have access to if their offices were located with the FSSG headquarters and the RCO gets additional labor to help with its workload. [Ref 42]

The relationship between the 2<sup>nd</sup> FSSG and the RCO at Camp Lejeune, NC is slightly different. Although the FSSG Marines share an office with the RCO, they operate more independently from the RCO. As a consequence, the FSSG Marines receive less access to base contracts so their “hands on experience” with base contracts is more limited than that received by the FSSG Marines at Camp Pendleton. This relationship is still very beneficial to both parties for reasons similar to those given for the 2<sup>nd</sup> FSSG and RCO Southwest. [Ref 45]

The relationship between the RCO Okinawa, Japan and the 3<sup>rd</sup> FSSG is different than the previous FSSG/RCO relationships. Here the FSSG contracting Marines are assigned to the RCO under a Fleet Assistance Program (FAP) as category I FAPs. The FAP provides the RCO Chief of the Contracting Office (CCO) more control over the FSSG 3044 Marines. As a result, the RCO CCO is able to assign larger contracts and more responsibility to the FSSG 3044s. The CCO has more direct influence in determining which 3044 is deployed, and consequently can weigh current workload against providing the required training and experience. The RCO CCO has the option of sending a 3044 that is assigned to the FSSG or the RCO proper and in essence provides direct support from his office to the MEF for deployed contracting personnel. The

increased influence exercised by the RCO is beneficial to the RCO in that it gives the RCO 3044 an opportunity to deploy and gain valuable experience supporting deployed units while giving the FSSG Marines the ability to work larger contracts thereby increasing their skills at administering more complicated and challenging contracts. [Ref 45]

### **3. 3044 MOS Requirements**

With an understanding of the command relationships that contingency contracting personnel fall under, this study now examines the process used to create a Marine assigned the 3044 MOS. It is important to note here that there is no difference in the training and education given to contingency and base enlisted contracting Marines. The only thing that differentiates a contingency contracting enlisted Marine from a base or garrison contracting enlisted Marine is the billet to which they are assigned. As mentioned previously, all the enlisted Marines with the 3044 MOS are capable of deploying. The contingency or FSSG Marines are simply in a “deployable” billet and hence are the first choice when the need for a deployed contracting Marine arises.

Enlisted Marines do not enter into the 3044 MOS directly from basic training. Instead, enlisted Marines generally from the supply field and possessing the rank of sergeant or higher apply for acceptance into the 3044 MOS. The Marine Corps MOS Manual lists the following criteria for Marines to be selected into the MOS:

- a. Summary. Purchasing and contracting specialists perform various duties incident to the acquisition of supplies and non-personal services purchased via open market from commercial and Government sources. Marines in this MOS must have the ability to work independently and be objective in applying purchasing and contracting laws and regulations in daily activities.
- b. Requirements/Prerequisites
  - (1) CL (clerical) score of 110 or higher.
  - (2) Must be interviewed and recommended by the Regional Contracting Officer.

- (3) Must be at least a sergeant with less than 2 years time in grade (waiverable to corporal) on second or subsequent enlistment with primary MOS 3043 (Primary MOS 3043 may be waived, on a case-by-case basis, when recommended by Regional Contracting Officer)
- (4) No convictions by court-martial, civilian courts, or nonjudicial punishment of any act involving larceny, fraud, or theft.
- (5) Must have excellent communicative skills, both verbally and in writing.
- (6) Have a minimum of 36 months of obligated service upon assignment of intended MOS of 3044.
- (7) Be able to type 45 words per minute, and have a general aptitude for computers.
- (8) Lateral move requests shall be approved through OccFld sponsor (Code LBO).
- (9) Marines who lateral-move into this MOS from outside OccFld 30 will be assigned MOS 3000 with an intended MOS of 3044. All Marines will be assigned to a Regional Contracting Office for a period of 6 months for On the Job Training (OJT). At the completion of OJT and upon the recommendation of the Regional Contracting Officer, these Marines will be assigned MOS 3044. [Ref 46]

#### **4. Education**

The Statutory DAWIA requirements, described at the end of Chapter II of this study, namely to have a baccalaureate degree and 24 semester credit hours of business related college coursework to enter the contracting force, applies to all Marines in the 3044 MOS. As a result an effort is made to recruit Marines that already have college courses under their belt. However, there is no requirement for enlisted Marines within

the supply or logistics fields to attend college classes while they are in those other fields. As a result many of the Marines entering the 3044 MOS must attend college classes outside normal work hours to meet the DAWIA education requirements. [Ref 41]

Under DAWIA, education requirements are mandatory by law. However, DAWIA also includes a provision to reimburse civilian and military members for their college tuition expenses under the Acquisition Workforce Tuition Assistance Program (AWTAP). This provision, however, only applies to enlisted personnel permanently assigned the 3044 MOS. Marines in an On-the-Job Training (OJT) status were not eligible for the DAWIA tuition assistance because they are not considered to be part of the acquisition workforce until they completed this OJT period. Their only option was to utilize the Marine Corps tuition assistance program available to all active duty military personnel. Until recently, the Marine Corps Tuition Assistance Program only provided for 75% of the tuition costs. Marines in an OJT status were, therefore, expected to pay for 25% of the tuition and for any required textbooks out of pocket. Beginning 1 October 2002, the Marine Corps tuition assistance program now pays 100% of tuition for Marines attending college courses, although Marines must still pay for the cost of textbooks out of pocket. [Ref 47]

## **5. Training**

Enlisted Marines began their career as a 3044 MOS contract specialist through assignment to an RCO to complete a six-month training period of OJT. Until recently, Marines in this OJT program were assigned a temporary MOS of 3000. This resulted in long time delays for Marines trying to get registered for courses. As a result, Marines are now assigned to a TO/Line number associated with an acquisition billet as soon as they are assigned to the OJT program. This permits the OJT Marine to register for the Level I contracting courses, which reduces the amount of time it takes to complete the Level I requirements - since most of the courses are on-line. Upon successful completion of the OJT period, and with the approval of the RCO CCO, the Marine is assigned the 3044 MOS. Once the permanent MOS is obtained, Marines are eligible to receive centralized funding to attend DAU courses and to obtain tuition assistance for their college courses under AWTAP. [Ref 47]

OJT Marines are typically assigned to the small purchase branch within the RCO to learn how the Government contracting process works by shadowing a contract specialist with experience. This training is informal with no established criteria that must be followed. The training is completely left in the hands of the contract specialist (civilian or Marine) that is given the responsibility of training the OJT Marine. During this one-on-one training, the OJT Marine is given instructions on how to fill out various contracting forms and educated on the Government contracting process in general. The contract specialist gives the OJT Marine tasks from actual contracts the specialist has been assigned. The trainer reviews any OJT work and corrects and explains mistakes. The CCO authorizes the OJT 3044 to be assigned a permanent 3044 MOS only when the contract specialist conducting the training is convinced the trainee has mastered the basic contracting skills necessary to be granted the MOS. [Ref 41]

Once the Marine is assigned the 3044 MOS the Marine can then register to attend resident DAU training courses that are fully funded. Marines can register to attend DAU courses without DAU funding while in an OJT status however, limited unit funding and a low priority for the limited number of seats make this virtually infeasible. In addition, many RCOs have a policy not to send OJT Marines to DAU courses until they have completed their six months of OJT. After attending CON 100, 101, and 104 Marines meet the basic training requirements for Level I certification. Table 5 indicates the current Marine Corps certification rates for the three levels of certification. [Ref 41]

Headquarters Marine Corps attributes the low number of personnel certified to the requirement for enlisted personnel to have a baccalaureate degree which few enlisted Marines have. In addition, the Marine Corps has had difficulty in getting 3044's in to courses at DAU. A major reason for this is the long backlog of personnel from all the branches of the Service trying to get their personnel trained through DAU. [Ref 41]

## **6. Continuous Learning**

Until recently, receiving the Level I certification initiated the 2-year clock for acquiring the 80 continuous learning points as mandated by the Under Secretary of Defense Memorandum discussed in Chapter II. [Ref 40] A subsequent Memo from the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) released on 13 September 2002 made the requirement applicable to all members of the acquisition

workforce regardless of certification status or level. [Ref 49] According to the 3044 Community Manager, Headquarters Marine Corps, the Navy's Director Acquisition Career Management (DACM) has yet to implement this policy, but is expected to do so during December 2002. [Ref 50]

## CONTRACTING

		Civilian		Military		
DAWIA Level	Workforce	Certified	% Cert	Workforce	Certified	% Cert
I	8	4	50%	33	19	57.6%
II	100	82	82%	75	56	74.7%
III	63	48	76.2%	3	1	33.2%
Total	171	133	77%	111	76	68.5%

Table 5. Marine Corps DAWIA Certification Level From: [Ref 48]

Only a few of the larger RCOs such as Camp Pendleton, Quantico, and Okinawa can fill enough seats (minimum of 12 acquisition workforce members) to host centrally funded or command-unique continuous learning courses. The smaller contracting offices rarely have the minimum number of qualified students to obtain this external funding and must, therefore, pay for continuous learning with unit funds. This places commanders in a difficult position of determining how much of their budget to commit to training while trying to satisfy all the other competing requirements for their scarce resources. [Ref 50]

Generally, tracking of continuous learning is not accomplished within the Marine Corps. Only a few of the contracting offices, such as Camp Pendleton, Barstow, and Okinawa, provide local tracking of continuous learning. The Marine Corps relies on the Navy's web site for acquisition training applications to register for DAU and Continuous Learning courses and tracking of Continuous Learning credits. At present, the only source of feedback the Marine Corps has from the Navy DACM is a consolidated percentage that lumps all civilian and military acquisition workforce personnel from all

acquisition career fields together. Table 6 contains the most recent Navy wide statistics on continuous learning dated 1 January 2002. [Ref 50]

Organization	Certified Workforce	# that Achieved CL Standard	% Achieved Standard	% Participation (cert wf)
NAVFAC	1156	268	23%	62%
MSC	85	13	15%	58%
MARINE CORPS	618	61	10%	51%
ONR	84	14	17%	44%
ALL OTHERS	920	91	10%	40%
NAVSEA	3724	329	9%	35%
NAVSUP	1574	170	11%	35%
NAVAIR	7386	488	7%	32%
SPAWAR	1167	119	10%	30%
BUMED	115	9	8%	23%
SSP	276	7	3%	13%
<b>DON Total</b>	<b>17105</b>	<b>1615</b>	<b>9%</b>	<b>36%</b>

Table 6. Total Navy Continuous Learning Statistics From: [Ref 48]

As the table indicates, the total Marine Corps acquisition workforce consists of 618 civilians and military members in all acquisition related fields. The 114 enlisted Marines with the 3044 MOS are included in this total of 618. According to the table only 10% of the total Marine Corps acquisition workforce achieved the goal of 80 continuous learning points as of January 1, 2002. At present this total cannot be broken down to reflect data related to the contracting workforce, thus there is no mechanism to identify the actual percentage of 3044s that are compliant or participate in the Continuous Learning Program.

## 7. Employment

As mentioned, enlisted 3044 Marines are assigned to either a base or a contingency contracting billet. Those Marines assigned to a base unit are employed in accordance with their rank and years of experience. This is done informally with no Marine Corps specific milestones that determine a Marine's level of experience. Junior Marines new to the field are typically given small routine contracts that require minimal paperwork and with heavy oversight by experienced contracting personnel. As Marines gain experience and increase their level of competency they are given larger dollar value



contracts and less oversight. Eventually, senior enlisted Marines will become managers of the small purchase or large contracts sections within a large RCO or Section leaders for one of the Contingency Contracting sections. [Ref 47]

Marines deploy either as a permanent member of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) or as a temporary member of a mission specific exercise or contingency command. The Marines assigned to the MEU are attached to the MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). This is typically a one-year assignment characterized by a six-month “workup” or training phase followed by a six-month deployment phase. Enlisted Marines assigned to a MEU typically provide contracting support once the Marine Ground Combat Element (GCE) deploys as part of an exercise or contingency operation on foreign shores. [Ref 51]

The other method of employing contingency contracting Marines is as a member of a specific contingency or training event conducted in a foreign country. This can be as a member of a Joint Task Force (JTF) or as a member of a Marine Corps specific event. Contracting Marines are involved in the planning stage for an event, deploy with the advance party to establish contracts with vendors, and close out contracts at the end of the deployment. [Ref 52]

## **C. AIRFORCE APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING**

### **1. Organizational Structure**

Like the Marine Corps, the United States Air Force contracting workforce consists of commissioned officers, enlisted personnel, and civilian contracting specialists. Figure 4 shows the number of personnel within each category from Fiscal Year 1995 through 2000. The Figure clearly indicates a reduction in workforce strength of about 500 personnel in a short five-year period, but enlisted numbers are relatively stable.

With the exception of Air Force commissioned officers being permanently assigned to the contracting field for their career, and being assigned to the MOS upon entering the service, vice getting a temporary MOS later in their career like Marine officers, the requirements to become a contracting officer in the Air Force are similar to those for Marine contracting officers. Since the officer community is outside the scope of this study, Air Force officers will only be mentioned when doing so aids the

understanding of enlisted contracting personnel within the Air Force. Likewise, the civilians within the Air Force workforce are outside the scope of this thesis and will not be discussed [Ref 54]




Figure 4. Air Force Contracting Workforce. From: [Ref 53]

The Air Force, which has a much larger pool of contracting personnel in comparison to the Marine Corps, is organized into a more centralized structure. Whereas the Marine Corps separates its contingency contracting personnel and its garrison contracting personnel into two separate command structures, the Air Force combines them into more centralized organizations with all of its enlisted personnel capable of performing both the garrison and the contingency functions at any given time. [Ref 54]

To accomplish this integrated approach the Air Force organizes its personnel into contracting wings that are further broken down into contracting squadrons that contain

two acquisition flights. Each flight contains two contracting teams with five members and one team leader. The organizational structure of these contracting squadrons is depicted in Figure 5. Notice that the contingency contracting cell is not permanently manned. When the need arises to support contingency operations personnel are pulled from the contingency teams and temporarily assigned to the contingency contracting cell for the duration of the contingency and then return to their respective teams when the contingency is concluded. [Ref 54]

Each contracting team is composed of a mixture of experienced and inexperienced personnel – both enlisted and officers. The workload for team members is comprised of garrison type contracts that are managed by the acquisition flight leader and the team leader. When a team member is scheduled to deploy in support of a contingency or exercise that member's workload is reassigned to other team or flight personnel. This system permits the team members to be fully employed on garrison type contracts while not deployed and ensures that when they do deploy contracts are not dropped or left incomplete. [Ref 54]

## **2. Enlisted Contracting AFSC Requirements**

Unlike the Marine Corps, enlisted jobs in the Air Force are called Air Force Specialty Codes (AFSC). Also differing from the Marine Corps, the Air Force assigns a series of progressive AFSCs to its enlisted personnel, whereas the Marine Corps assigns only one MOS to its enlisted personnel for the duration of their career. The AFSC consists of five alphanumeric characters that are coded to represent different aspects of the job. The Air Force assigns the following AFSCs to its personnel: 6C000, 6C011, 6C031, 6C051, 6C071, and 6C091. The 4<sup>th</sup> number in the AFSC represents the individual's skill level. These different skill levels are based on several factors such as rank, time in a certain level, and additional training. The requirements for entry into this AFSC are listed below:

**Knowledge.** Knowledge is mandatory of: pricing techniques, market trends, supply sources, US or foreign commercial practices and marketing factors contributing to prices of items, equipment, materials or services. Knowledge is mandatory of basic computer applications, audit procedures, policies, laws, and directives governing purchasing and contingency contracting policies and procedures.

**Education.** For entry into this specialty, completion of 24 semester hours in business related subjects, such as accounting, business finance, law, contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, quantitative methods, and organization and management is desirable, or possession of a baccalaureate degree.

**Training.** The following training is mandatory for award of the AFSC indicated:

6C031. Completion of the apprentice contracting specialist course.

6C071. Achievement of Level II Certification in contracting under the Acquisition Professional Development Program, and completion of Defense Acquisition University (DAU) contingency contracting course (CON 234).

**Experience.** The following experience is mandatory for award of the AFSC indicated:

6C051. in and possession of AFSC 6C031. Also, experience in functions such as assisting and performing duties involved in simplified acquisition procedures, negotiations, and other approved methods.

6C071. Qualification in and possession of AFSC 6C051. Also, experience in contracting for commodities, services, construction and contract administration. Ability to perform Contingency Contracting Officer (CCO) duties.

6C091. Qualification in and possession of AFSC 6C071.

Other. The following are mandatory as indicated:

For entry into this specialty, ability to communicate effectively in writing.

For entry, award, and retention of these AFSCs:

Ability to speak distinctly.

Never convicted of a felony. Never been convicted by court-martial or never have received nonjudicial punishment for dereliction in the performance of duties involving contracting activities, larceny, misappropriation of government funds or property or financial irresponsibility.

Strength Req: G

Physical Profile 333233

Citizenship No

Required Aptitude Score: G-70

Technical Training: Course #: L3ABR6C031 005 Length (Days): 20 [Ref 55]




Figure 5. Air Force Contracting Squadron Organization. From: [Ref 53]

Unlike the Marine Corps, which assigns the contracting MOS as a secondary or follow-on MOS, the Air Force contracting AFSC is an entry level one for the their enlisted Airmen. Although enlisted personnel can enter the AFSC later in their career, most Airmen enter the contracting field straight out of basic training. These enlisted personnel then remain in the contracting field for the remainder of their career. [Ref 54]

### 3. Career Development

With a larger population and an entry-level base, the Air Force has been able to develop a structured approach to its career development. The document that guides this career development process is the AFSC 6C0X1 Contracting Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP). This document clearly establishes milestones that must be met for an individual to progress from one contracting level to the next. Also contained within this document is the Contracting Career Field: Enlisted Career Path Pyramid shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6. Contracting Career Field: Enlisted Career Path Pyramid From: [Ref 56]

In addition to the three DAWIA certification levels described in Chapter II, the Air Force assigns skill levels to its contracting personnel. The CFETP contains a detailed and comprehensive checklist that outlines all the requirements that must be completed for each skill level. This checklist gets initialed by the individual being trained, the trainer conducting the training, and a certifier that has attended a training certification course. Once an individual has received all the required signatures for a level, training can begin

for the next level. These skill levels are intended to ensure a standard level of experience across the contracting field for the purpose of making assignments [Ref 56]

#### 4. Education

Like the Marine Corps, the Air Force enlisted personnel are subject to the same education requirements outlined in Chapter II. As Figure 7 shows, the Air Force is struggling to get its enlisted members through college courses to meet this requirement (15% of enlisted personnel have bachelor degrees). Since the Air Force considers all of its enlisted personnel to be in the contingency contracting force, they are able to bring enlisted members into the field and can employ them as contracting specialists, but must get them through college courses to receive certification through DAWIA. [Ref 54]




Figure 7. Experience And Education of Air Force Contracting Workforce From: [Ref 53]

Like the other branches of the military, the Air Force has an Air-Force-wide tuition assistance program that pays 100% of the tuition costs for its Service members that volunteer to attend college courses for personal improvement. This program is applicable to any type of college course the enlisted members want to take, but only covers the cost of tuition. Lab fees, books, and other course materials must be paid for by the individual and are not reimbursed under this program. Because of the mandatory nature of the DAWIA requirements, the Air Force has an additional tuition assistance program for its acquisition personnel. This program covers all the costs associated with business courses taken to meet the DAWIA requirements and therefore places no financial hardship on the enlisted member. [Ref 57]

## **5. Training**

In addition to sending its enlisted personnel to DAU courses, the Air Force conducts its own contracting training courses at Lackland AFB. Table 7 indicates the timeline for attendance at Air Force and DAU training courses.

Upon graduation from Basic Training, enlisted personnel attend contracting apprentice school at Lackland AFB. Enlisted personnel are then assigned to one of the Air Force Contracting Squadrons. There the apprentice completes OJT core training and the two Contracting Career Development Courses (CDCs) within a 12-month period. Completion of these three courses gives equivalency for CON 101. Air Force enlisted personnel then attend the remaining courses for DAWIA certification at DAU. After completion of CON 104 and meeting the education requirements discussed above the enlisted member is granted Level I DAWIA certification and attends CON 234 and begins taking the CON 202/204/210 sequence of DAU courses required for Level II DAWIA Certification. [Ref 56]



Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
Technical Training	CDC – “A” Course						CDC – “B” Course					
On-the-Job Training	5-skill level up-grade training (must complete OJT core training before upgrade to 5-skill level)											
APDP Certification									Start APDP Certification Requirements <sup>a</sup>			

Month	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24
Technical Training				max CDC								
On-the-Job Training	UGT continues		upgrade to 5-skill level (min 15 - average 18 months)									max UGT 5-yl
APDP Certification	attend CON 104 **					CON Exit						

Month	25-36	37-48	49-60
Technical Training			
On-the-Job Training			
APDP Certification	CON 202 / 204 / 210 CON 234***		

<sup>a</sup>As a minimum, APDP Contracting Certification requires at least 24 hours of business education. This requirement is explained in this CFETP at paragraph 8.5.

<sup>\*\*</sup>Completion of the contracting Career Development Course is mandatory prior to attendance.

<sup>\*\*\*</sup>During this time frame, CON 234 attendance is desired. Note: It is required for upgrade training to the 7-skill level.

Table 7. Air Force Enlisted Personnel Timeline for Training From: [Ref 56]

The guiding document for Air Force contingency contracting, Air Force Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFFARS) Appendix CC, places an additional training requirement upon enlisted as well as commissioned members of the Air Force Contingency Contracting Workforce. The AFFARS Appendix CC states the following:

Appropriate training shall be provided to all contracting officers designated to support contingency operations. Contingency Operational Contracting Support Plan (COCSP) training may be included as a part of the training required by AFI 64-102, Operational Contracting. COCSP training should be provided to key personnel of major customer activities having contingency contracting support requirements. [Ref 58]

As a result of this requirement, major Air Force contracting commands have developed comprehensive training programs specifically designed to sharpen the skills of deploying personnel. This cyclic training is conducted in three phases during a 12-month

period. This training consists of lectures, practical exercises and military skills. The practical exercises consist of scenarios based on after action reports and are tailored to the unit's area of responsibility. Training is conducted for one eight hour period per month. Newly arriving personnel are assigned to one of four training teams. Each team has a mixture of officers and enlisted personnel of varying degrees of rank and experience. Team members participate in at least two cycles of training. [Ref 54]

During these training cycles, Air Force contracting personnel sharpen their skills in preparation for a biannual event called Air Force Top Dollar (AFTD). This competition began in December of 1992 as a competition for Air Force comptrollers. It became an Air Force-wide competition by 1994 and included contracting personnel for the first time in 1995. The teams now consist of five comptrollers and two contingency contracting personnel. These teams compete at local levels and then move to regional, district and finally to the Air Force level. The competition is focused around scenarios that teams must navigate through, but also tests military skills such as marksmanship, NBC skills, and physical fitness. In July of 2001 the Air Force comptroller and contracting communities developed a standard set of training tools for teams to use in preparation for AFTD. These tools are located on the AFTD web site. [Ref 59]

## **6. Continuous Learning**

Currently the Air Force does not have a Service-wide tracking system to track how well the Air Force is complying with the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) policy described in Chapter II. As a result, no statistics are available to determine how well the Air Force is meeting the 80 hours of Continuous Learning. The Air Force is currently testing a system that is derived from the Navy system. The Air Force system is expected to be released sometime in early calendar year 2003. [Ref 59]

## **7. Employment**

The Air Force method of employing personnel to support contingency contracting deployments is based on Designed Operational Capability (DOC) Statements and Unit Type Codes (UTC). A DOC statement is prepared by the parent Major Command (MAJCOM) and includes information about the unit's full wartime capability based upon the authorized manpower and materiel strength of the unit. The DOC Statements are based on written requests and updated or changed as required. This statement simply

defines the supposed capability of a unit and the resources required to provide that capability. [Ref 54]


The UTC is a five character alphanumeric code that identifies a force package designed to provide a specific capability. It is a standard communications symbol used in the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the Contingency Operation/Mobility Planning and Execution System (COMPES) automated systems. The UTC can be as small as one person or as large as a carrier battlegroup. The UTCs can be either independent or dependent. Independent UTCs are designed to operate alone and be self-sufficient. Dependent UTCs are dependent on other sources for support to fulfill their capability. Enlisted contracting personnel do not deploy in support of a contingency contracting operation until they are at least a skill level five. Appendix C contains the current listing of Air Force UTCs. [Ref 54]

#### **D. ARMY APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING**

The United States Army is currently in a transition period with respect to the way it utilizes its enlisted personnel to support contingency contracting operations. The Army, which assigns its enlisted and commissioned personnel an MOS like the Marine Corps, does not have a permanent MOS for enlisted contracting personnel. The Army does have a permanent MOS for commissioned officers working in the contracting field and these officers deploy on contingency contracting missions. Figure 8 shows the current organizational structure for the United States Army Contracting Agency.

Contingency contracting officers deploy from these commands to support operations around the world. Commands with an asterisk indicate units where enlisted personnel will be assigned once a permanent MOS is developed. Contingency contracting officers deploy from these major commands to support contingency contracting missions. [Ref 62]

# DRAFT PREDECISIONAL ARMY CONTRACTING AGENCY HEADQUARTERS



ENCL 3

Figure 8. U.S. Army Contracting Agency Headquarters. From: [Ref 61]

Although the Army depends primarily upon commissioned officers to perform its contingency contracting missions, it does utilize enlisted personnel in the contracting field, but contracting is not their primary duty. Members of the Army Quartermaster Branch select highly skilled and trained NCOs, above the rank of Sergeant, to be members of the Army's Enlisted Acquisition and Technology Workforce (A&TWF). Once selected these NCOs attend CON 101, CON 104, and Contingency Contracting 234 CON 100 is taken on-line). After completing these three courses, these soldiers are given the Additional Skill Identifier (ASI): G1 (Contract Agent). These enlisted workforce members receive the same training, education, and professional development opportunities as their officer and Department of the Army civilian counterparts. [Ref 63]

Soldiers must meet the following prerequisites to be considered eligible for the G1 ASI:

Prerequisites to be considered for favorable enrollment in the Acquisition Corps workforce include:

Individual should be affiliated with the QM Branch preferably 92A or 92Y

Grade E5 through E9

Demonstrated outstanding performance of assigned duties. (not waivable). Recommended in writing by an officer in the candidate's chain of command in the rank of LTC or higher (Volunteers only - not waivable)

Exhibit stability in personal affairs as outlined in AR 600-20 (not waivable)

No punishment by UCMJ during the years preceding the nomination and no history of frequent UCMJ punishments. (not waivable)

Must have a minimum of 3 years of service remaining upon completion of Level I Certification criteria

Must meet height and weight standards (not waivable)

Must be competitive for promotion (not waivable)

Must have a Baccalaureate degree and 24 semester hours in business management, accounting, finance, law, economics, marketing, purchasing, quantitative methods, industrial management, or organization and management. DANTES or CLEP equivalency exams may be included) (waivable) ALL ENLISTED SOLDIERS entering the Acquisition Workforce Program will participate in local training plans which include numerous training rotations and civilian education requirements.

Must be basic course graduate or selectee (not waivable)

GT 110 or higher (waivable)

Must maintains a security clearance

Be a SGT or higher with 15 years of service or less. (waivable)

Have a successful tour in a leadership position (waivable)

Not assigned to back-to-back special duty assignments (waivable)

PERMS review conducted, no derogatory information found (i.e. GO Letter of Reprimands, DUI/DWI, Letters of indebtedness, missing NCOERs should be attached. (If not, please explain below)

Released from a fenced unit by COHORT/DIST

Rangers must be released from CA DIV [Ref 64]

The Army realizes the important contribution enlisted contracting personnel have made and contingency contracting efforts of the Army and have designated 167 billets

throughout the Army to be permanently filled by NCOs with a permanent contracting MOS. Once the MOS is permanent the Army intends to open the field to all promotable E-5s with a minimum of 6 years of service through E-8s in non-critically short MOSs. [Ref 63]

#### **E. NAVY APPROACH TO CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING**

Current Department of the Navy Policy only utilizes commissioned officers in the contracting field and therefore only commissioned officers perform the contingency contracting mission for the Navy. The author found no indication that the Navy is considering the use of enlisted contingency contracting personnel.

#### **F. SUMMARY**

This chapter presented data collected from literature reviews and personal interviews conducted by the researcher. The data revealed that each of the Military Services takes a different approach to the utilization of enlisted personnel performing contingency contracting. The range is from heavy dependence by the Air Force and Marines, to growing dependence by the Army, to not utilizing them at all by Navy. This data describes the entrance requirements, organizational structure, training, education, and employment of enlisted personnel within each of the Military Services. This information is combined with the survey results in Chapter IV, which follows this chapter, to provide the bases for the analysis presented in Chapter V.

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## **IV. 3044 SURVEY RESULTS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

After looking at the environment of contingency contracting and exploring how each Military Service approaches the employment of enlisted contingency contracting personnel, this chapter now examines the results of a survey the researcher conducted of the 3044 community within the Marine Corps. This survey was a web-based survey sent to the entire 3044 community. The purpose was to evaluate the attitudes of enlisted 3044s towards those aspects of their field that were within the scope of this study. Those areas include the current structure, education, training, and employment of enlisted Marines within the 3044 community. Using data from the survey, the researcher created all of the tables and figures used in this chapter.

### **B. SURVEY PARTICIPATION**

The researcher utilized the “Survey Said” program to create the survey included in Appendix D. This survey was then placed on an active web site hosted by one of the NPS servers. The link to the survey web site was sent via e-mail attachment to all the senior enlisted 3044 Marines in the Marine Corps with instructions to take the survey and forward the link to all the 3044s under their supervision. As Appendix A indicated, there are approximately 116 enlisted 3044s currently serving in the MOS. Of that population, the researcher received 61 responses from members of the 3044 community. That response equates to an approximate response rate of 53%.

### **C. SURVEY RESULTS**

#### **1. Demographics**

##### ***a. Question 1 Results***

Question 1 asked the respondents their current rank. This question was designed to ensure that a representative sample was obtained from the population of 3044 Marines. Figure 9 shows the sample distribution by rank. The vertical axis measures the number of respondents and the horizontal axis shows the respondent’s rank.

##### ***b. Question 2 Results***

Question 2 asked respondents to select their command from those options given or select “other” as their response. The researcher only included as a possible



option those major commands with more than one or two 3044s. The results of question 2 are shown in Figure 10. The vertical axis show the command options respondents were allowed to choose, and the horizontal axis shows the number of respondents.




Figure 9. Rank Distribution.




Figure 10. Command Distribution.

### c. Question 3 Results

Question 3 was designed to determine if Marines felt their rank was adequate for the performance of their duties. Sixty of the respondents answered question 3 and eleven of them or 18.03% responded that their rank was not adequate for the performance of their duties. The remaining 81.96% (49) responded “yes” to the question.

***d. Question 4 Results***

Question 4 asked the respondents who gave a “No” response to question 3 to briefly explain why they felt their rank was not adequate. All of the open-ended questions in this survey allowed the Marines to enter up to 30,000 characters in a window that followed the question. Respondents could list as many reasons as the space would allow. The results from question 4 are summarized below for the 11 respondents that answered “No”:

- 45.45% (5) Responsibilities and job demands exceed that of peers in other MOSs
- 36.36% (4) Current rank below that required by billet
- 18.18% (2) Not taken seriously by seniors
- 9.09% (1) No time for PME
- 9.09% (1) NA

***e. Question 5 Results***

Since one of the prerequisites for entering the 3044 MOS is to have been at least a Sergeant with the 3043 (Supply) MOS, question 5 was asked to find out how many Marines are entering the MOS from the Supply field, the related fields of Logistics and Administration, or some other MOS. The results of this question are shown in Figure 11. This graph lists the MOS choices on the vertical axis and the number of respondents along the horizontal axis.

The graph shows that 60% of the Marines entering the 3044 field are from the Supply MOS with the remaining 40% being comprised of; 20% Other MOSs, 18.33% from the Administration field, and 1.67% from the Logistics field.

***f. Question 6 Results***

Question 6 asked the respondents to indicate how long they have been a member of the 3044 Community. The responses to question 6 are shown in Figure 12. The number of respondents are shown on the vertical axis and the number of years in the MOS on the horizontal axis.




Figure 11. Prior MOS.




Figure 12. Years in the 3044 MOS.

***g. Question 7 Results***

Question 7 asked the respondents to indicate their current DAWIA Certification Level. The responses to question 7 are summarized below:

- 51.35% (19) Level I
- 43.24% (16) Level II
- 5.41% (2) Level III
- 39.34% (24) Not certified

***h. Question 8 Results***

Question 8 asked the respondents to indicate the DAWIA Certification Level their current billet requires. The responses for question 8 are summarized below:

- 40.74% (22) Level I
- 55.56% (30) Level II
- 3.70% (2) Level III
- 11.48% (7) did not know what level their billet required

The researcher compared the individual responses to question 7 with the corresponding individual responses to question 8 to determine how many Marines did not hold the certification level their job required. The researcher found that 50.8% (31) indicated that their current DAWIA certification level was below that required by their billet.

***i. Question 9 Results***

Question 9 asked the respondents to describe any difficulties they experienced when trying to attain their DAWIA Certification Level. The results of question 9 are summarized below:

- 37.70% (23) Difficulty getting a DAU seat
- 14.75% (9) Difficulty getting time off from work to attend courses
- 11.47% (7) Difficulties getting college work completed
- 6.55% (4) Lack of funding to attend courses
- 4.92% (3) Frequent deployments
- 3.27% (2) Inaccurate information in Register Now
- 1.64% (1) Missing college classes while TAD for DAU classes

***j. Question 10 Results***

Question 10 asked the respondents if they were currently assigned to a base or a contingency contracting billet. The results to question 10 are summarized below:

- 84.75% (50) Base contracting billet
- 15.25% (9) Contingency contracting billet
- 3.28% (2) Did not answer the question.

***k. Question 11 Results***

Question 11 asked the respondents to indicate if they had completed a tour in a “B” Billet (an assignment outside an individual’s primary MOS) after receiving the 3044 MOS. Of the 61 respondents only 10% (6) of the Marines indicated they had completed a tour in a “B”.

***l. Question 12 Results***

Question 12 asked the Marines to indicate if they had completed a tour on the Staff Noncommissioned Officer (SNCO) degree completion Program after receiving the 3044 MOS. Of the 61 respondents none of them indicated having participated in the program after receiving the 3044 MOS.

***m. Question 13 Results***

Question 13 asked those Marines that answered “yes” to question 11 or 12 to list any difficulties they experienced upon returning to the 3044 MOS. Of the six respondents that answered “yes” to question 11, 16.66% (1) indicated that he did not experience any difficulties upon returning to the MOS. The remaining 83.33% (5) indicated that upon returning to the 3044 MOS they experienced problems with the changing regulations, the change from purchasing to contracting, changes to FAR part 12, and the increased role of the Government Purchase Card.

**2. Training**

***a. Question 14 Results***

Question 14 asked respondents to indicate how long they spent in an On-The-Job (OJT) status. Current Marine Corps policy is to have Marines spend six months in the (OJT) status. The responses to question 14 are shown in Figure 13. This graph shows months in the OJT period along the vertical axis and number of respondents along the horizontal axis.

***b. Question 15 Results***

Question 15 asked the respondents to list their first duty assignment upon completion of the OJT period. The results from question 15 are summarized below:

- 67.21% (41) Base Contracting Office
- 11.47% (7) Still in OJT status
- 6.55% (4) Contingency Contracting office
- 14.75% (9) Respondents did not answer the question




Figure 13. OJT Time.

**c. Question 16 Results**

Question 16 asked respondents to indicate what DAU courses they were able to attend during the OJT period. The results of question 16 are summarized below:

- 36.06% (22) CON 101
- 29.51% (18) NONE
- 13.115% (8) CON 237
- 8.19% (5) CON 104
- 4.92% (3) CON 234
- 3.72% (2) CON 100
- 3.72% (2) CON 202
- 4.92% (3) Respondents did not answer the question

**d. Question 17 Results**

Question 17 asked the respondents to indicate what difficulties they experienced trying to attend DAU courses - during the OJT period only. The results of question 17 are summarized below.

- 37.70% (23) No problems experienced
- 26.23% (16) DAU course seats were unavailable
- 11.47% (7) Office policy did not allow them to attend DAU courses during OJT
- 8.19% (5) On-line courses were difficult
- 3.72% (2) Funding was not available for TAD courses
- 1.64% (1) Did not understand the process to register for classes
- 1.64% (1) Family commitments
- 11.47% (7) Respondents did not answer the question

***e. Question 18 Results***

Question 18 asked the respondents to indicate what difficulties they experienced trying to attend DAU courses after their OJT period. The results for question 18 are summarized below:

- 27.87% (17) DAU course seats not available
- 21.31% (13) No problems experienced
- 8.19% (5) Not applicable
- 8.19% (5) Getting time off from work to attend DAU courses
- 6.55% (4) Deployments
- 4.92% (3) Restrictions on DAU attendance
- 4.92% (3) Personal commitments
- 3.72% (2) Funding not available

***f. Question 19 Results***

Question 19 asked respondents to indicate if they were able to achieve the required 80 continuous learning points required during the last 2 year period ending 30 September 2002. Of the 61 responses received; 54.39% (31) responded “Yes”, 45.61% (26) Responded “No” and 6.56% (4) did not respond to the question.

***g. Question 20 Results***

Question 20 asked the respondents that answered “No” to question 19 to indicate the difficulties they experienced trying to achieve the 80 points required. The responses for question 20 are summarized below (percentages based on 26 respondents):

- 23.07% (6) Deployments
- 15.38% (4) Did not understand requirements

- 15.38% (4) Less than 2 years in the MOS to date
- 15.38% (4) Not certified (certified personnel only prior to 13 September 2002)
- 11.54% (3) Problems getting credits registered
- 11.54% (3) Lack of opportunities
- 7.70% (2) Time off work to attend training

***h. Question 21 Results***

Question 21 asked the respondents to indicate if their contracting office/unit/section had a designated training Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO). 40.68% (24) of the respondents indicated “Yes”, 59.32% (35) indicated “No”, and 3.28% (2) of the respondents did not answer the question.

***i. Question 22 Results***

Question 22 asked the respondents that replied “yes” to question 21 to indicate what kind of training is included in their annual training plan. Respondents listed (35) topics that were covered in training plans, however, it was obvious that some offices had very good training plans while others were not comprehensive. Additional comments ranged from “we cover everything” to “we are working on one” to “not a priority in this office” indicating annual training plans were not standardized across the Marine Corps. In addition, none of the respondents indicated training being done that was specifically geared towards contingency contracting.

**3. Education**

***a. Question 23 Results***

Question 23 asked the respondents to indicate the highest degree of education they currently possess. The results from question 23 are summarized below:

- 56.67% (34) High School Diploma or equivalent
- 25.00% (15) Associate Degree
- 18.33% (11) Baccalaureate Degree
- 0.00% (0) Masters Degree or higher
- 1.64% (1) Did not respond to the question

***b. Question 24 Results***

Question 24 asked the respondents to indicate if they currently meet the 24 semester credit hours of business related courses required under Section 824 of the



Defense Authorization Act of 2002. Also, 53.33% (32) of the respondents indicated “Yes”, 46.67 (28) indicted “No” and 1.64% (1) did not respond to the question.

**c. Question 25 Results**

Question 25 asked the respondents to indicate how many business -related college credit hours they possessed, prior to entering the MOS, if they do not currently meet the 24-semester hour minimum. The results of Question 25 are shown in Figure 14 with number of semester hours on the vertical axis and number of respondents on the horizontal axis.




Figure 14. Prior College.

**d. Question 26 Results**

Question 26 asked the respondents that answered “No” to question 24 to indicate how many business-related college semester credit hours they have been able to achieve after entering the 3044 MOS. The responses to question 26 are included in Figure 15. This graph shows semester hours along the horizontal axis and the number of respondents along the vertical axis.

**e. Question 27 Results**

Question 27 asked the respondents to indicate if they attend college courses during the workday. The responses indicate that 15.52% (9) of the respondents do attend college courses during the workday, 84.48% (49) of the respondents do not

attend college during the workday, and 4.92% (3) of the respondents did not answer the question.




Figure 15. Post MOS College.

*f. Question 28 Results*

Question 28 asked the respondents to describe problems they have encountered when trying to attend college courses after entering the MOS. The responses to question 28 are summarized below:

- 24.60% (15) Did not experience problems
- 21.31% (13) Deployments
- 14.75% (9) Availability of college courses
- 8.19% (5) Long Work hours
- 8.19% (5) Personal Issues
- 6.55% (4) Lack of tuition assistance funds
- 3.72% (2) Conflicts with DAU courses
- 1.64% (1) Lost credits when transferring schools due to new duty assignments
- 1.64% (1) Books too expensive
- 29.51% (18) Did not answer the question

***g. Question 29 Results***

Question 29 asked the respondents to indicate how their educational opportunities could be improved. The results of question 29 are summarized below:

- 22.95% (14) Time off from work to attend classes
- 11.47% (7) Improving the tuition assistance process
- 8.19% (5) Make SNCO degree completion program
- 6.55% (4) Improve college selections on base
- 6.55% (4) Get college credit for DAU courses
- 27.87% (17) Respondents did not answer the question

**4. Contingency Contracting Experience**

***a. Question 30 Results***

Question 30 asked the respondents to indicate if they had the opportunity to serve in a contingency contracting billet. Results to this question revealed that 44.07% (26) of the respondents indicated “Yes”, 55.93% (33) answered “No”, and 3.28% (2) of the respondents did not answer the question.

***b. Question 31 Results***

Question 31 asked those respondents that answered “No” to question 30 to briefly describe what prevented them from serving in a contingency contracting billet. The results of question 31 are shown below (percentages based on 29 of the 33 respondents to question 30 that responded to this question – 4 failed to respond):

- 37.93% (11) Billets not available
- 31.03% (9) Still in OJT
- 20.68% (6) Not certified
- 10.34% (3) Told too junior
- 3.45% (1) Chief billets normally do not deploy
- 3.45% (1) No reason
- 3.45% (1) Unknown

***c. Question 32 Results***

Question 32 asked those respondents that were not able to serve in a contingency contracting billet if they felt they were less competitive for promotion. Results revealed that 51.51% (17) of the respondents indicated “Yes” they felt less

competitive for promotion, 57.50% (23) indicated “No”, and 34.43% (21) did not answer the question. Percentages for question 32 are based on the total sample size of 61 survey respondents since several of the Marines that responded “yes” to question 30 chose to answer this question anyway.

***d. Question 33 Results***

Question 33 asked the respondents to indicate how many tours they completed in contingency contracting billets (PCS assignments not temporary deployments). Figure 16 shows the results of the question 33. The graph shows the number of tours along the horizontal axis and the number of respondents along the vertical axis.




Figure 16. Number of Contingency Contracting Tours.

***e. Question 34 Results***

Question 34 asked the respondents to indicate how many contingencies or training deployments the respondents participated in during their most recent contingency contracting tour only requiring them to perform their contingency contracting mission. Figure 17 contains the results of question 34. This graph shows the number of contingencies along the horizontal axis and the number of respondents along the vertical axis.




Figure 17. Number of Deployments during Most Recent Contingency Tour.

***f. Question 35 Results***

Question 35 asked the respondents to indicate the number of contingency or exercise deployments they participated in during all prior Contingency Contracting tours that required them to perform their contingency contracting mission. The results of question 35 are shown in Figure 18. This graph shows the number of contingencies along the vertical axis and the number of respondents along the horizontal axis.

***g. Question 36 Responses***

Question 36 asked respondents to indicate if they were issued any waivers to be able to deploy in support of their contingency contracting mission. Only two respondents answered the question. Both indicated that they received a waiver for their certification level.

***h. Question 37 Results***

Question 37 asked the respondents to indicate if they had the opportunity to participate in operations or exercises where the respondent had the opportunity to work with enlisted contingency contracting personnel from other Services. Results revealed that 44.07% (26) indicated “Yes” they had the opportunity to work with contingency contracting personnel from other services, 55.93% (33) indicated “No”, and 3.28% (2) did not respond to the question.




Figure 18. All Previous Contingency Contracting Deployments.

*i. Question 38 Results*

Question 38 asked the respondents that responded “yes” to question 37 to indicate how they would rate the training other Services receive compared to the training the respondent received. The results to this question revealed that 53.84%(14) of the 26 respondents that answered “yes” indicated their counterpart’s training was “better”, 7.69% (2) responded “Worse”, and 34.61%(9) indicated the training was the “Same”.

*j. Question 39 Results*

Question 39 asked the respondents that responded “yes” to question 37 to indicate how they would rate the education opportunities of other Services compared to those of the respondent. Results indicate that 73.07% (19) of the 26 respondents that answered “yes” to question 37 indicated their counterpart’s education opportunities were “Better”, 3.85% (1) indicated it was “Worse”, and 19.23% (5) indicated it was the same.

*k. Question 40 Results*

Question 40 asked the respondents to indicate how they felt the Marine Corps could improve its contingency contracting Process. The results of question 40 are summarized below:

- 27.87% (17) Better contingency contracting training
- 8.19% (5) Increase the number of Marines at the FSSGs
- 6.55% (4) More deployments

- 6.55% (4) Better equipment for deployments
- 6.55% (4) Combine the FSSG and Base Marines into one office
- 4.92% (3) Increase the time between completing OJT and deploying (experience)
- 4.92% (3) Establish Standing Operating Procedures (SOP) for contingency contracting.
- 3.72% (2) Educate commanders on involving 3044s in planning for deployments
- 1.64% (1) More notice prior to deployments
- 1.64% (1) More joint exercises
- 50.82% (31) Respondents did not answer the question or put NA

## 5. **Future Intentions**

### *a. Question 41 Results*

Question 41 asked the respondents to indicate if they plan to get an Associates degree, Bachelors degree, or no degree while on active duty. The results revealed that 9.09% (5) indicated they intended to get their Associates degree while on active duty, 83.64% (46) indicated they planned to get their Baccalaureate degree, 7.27%(4) indicated they do not plan to get their degree while on active duty and 9.84% (6) did not respond to the question.

### *b. Question 42 Results*

Question 42 asked the respondents to indicate what their plans were once they received their desired degree. Figure 19 shows the results of this question. This graph shows decision options along the horizontal axis and the number of respondents along the vertical axis.

### *c. Question 43 Results*

Question 43 asked the respondents planning to exit active duty to indicate what would be an attractive incentive to keep them on active duty. The responses to this question are shown in Figure 20. This graph lists the incentives along the vertical axis and the number of respondents along the horizontal axis.




Figure 19. Stay or Go Once Desired Degree is Achieved.




Figure 20. Incentives to Remain on Active Duty.

**d. Question 44 Results**

Question 44 asked the respondents to indicate what changes they would recommend to the 3044 MOS. The results of question 44 are summarized below:

- 42.625 (26) Create a Warrant Officer program more 3044s
- 18.03% (11) Improve training
- 14.75% (9) Make the 9656 commissioned officer MOS permanent
- 14.75% (9) Higher retention bonuses



- 11.47% (7) Improve promotions
- 9.83% (6) Allow 3044s to be commissioned officers after receiving their degree
- 6.55% (4) Combine base and FSSG Marines
- 3.725 (2) Standardize FSSGs
- 3.72% (2) Establish military only DAU courses
- 3.72% (2) Eliminate computer based DAU training courses – make classroom
- 3.72% (2) Change structure
- 3.72% (2) Improve incentives
- 1.64% (1) Annual Chiefs Conference
- 1.645 (1) Limit the number of OJTs allowed into MOS
- 1.64% (1) Do not allow corporals to enter MOS

#### **D. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

The questions in the survey conducted by the researcher were designed to evaluate the attitudes of the current population of 3044s with respect to the structure, training, education, and employment characteristics of their MOS field as they view them. In addition to their attitudes about these topics, the survey questions attempted to elicit their ideas on how these characteristics could be changed to improve their MOS. The data contained in this chapter will be analyzed in conjunction with the information contained in Chapters II and III to determine possibilities for improving the 3044 MOS. The following chapter, Chapter V, contains that analysis.

## **V. ANALYSIS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This chapter analyzes the data presented in Chapters II through IV. The analysis evaluates current Marine Corps policies and practices within the 3044 enlisted community indicated by the survey results, literature reviews, and personal interviews. The analysis also compares these policies and practices of the Marine Corps to those of the other Services to determine where the Marine Corps might alter its practices to improve the quality of the enlisted contingency contracting Marines it deploys. The analysis will look at the following broad areas: organizational structure, rank structure, education, training, and employment.

### **B. CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES**

The current organizational structure of the 3044 community developed as a result of the Marine Corps philosophy that guides how Marines are organized for combat operations. Essentially, Marines are assigned to either deploying commands or non-deploying commands. Figure 1 depicted the three basic deploying commands within the Marine Corps - Division, Wing, and FSSG. All combat arms Marines (infantry, tanks, LAV, AAV, etc.) fall under the command of the division commander. All aviation related Marines (pilots, aviation mechanics, air traffic controllers, etc.) fall under the command of the Wing Commander. Although there are support Marines assigned to the division and wing to facilitate logistical support, most support Marines (contingency contracting, supply, fuel, construction, military police, etc.) fall under the command of the FSSG Commander. Non-deploying commands are typically bases and air stations under the command of a base commander. Marines assigned to these bases or stations are normally not in a deploying status. They are also typically support type Marines (base contracting, facilities, legal, etc.).

The strength of this structure is that it gives the commanders uninterrupted positive control over their Marines. Since the FSSG commander is tasked with providing all the support Marines required for a deployment, having all those Marines work directly for him ensures that he knows the capabilities of those Marines he is sending on deployments. If any of the support Marines sent on a deployment are less than fully

capable of performing their job, the FSSG commander will ultimately be responsible for that Marine's performance. As a result, having all those support Marines within his chain of command allows that FSSG commander to appoint subordinate commanders under him that will ensure deploying support Marines are fully capable of performing their mission. The FSSG Marines are also given more combat skills training than their counterparts at base commands to ensure they are adequately prepared for the uncertainties of a combat environment.

This organizational structure, however, creates a problem for the contingency contracting personnel when it comes to keeping their contracting skills sharp. Unlike the skills required to employ an infantry weapon, which have changed very little over the past 50 years, contracting is a dynamic field that requires active participation on a daily basis to ensure new technology and changing regulations are understood and mastered. Having the contingency contracting Marines separated from the base contracting Marines creates a situation where the base contracting Marines are actively participating in contracting on a daily basis, but the contingency contracting Marines only participate in contracting when they are deployed. This means that contingency contracting Marines are underutilized when not deployed allowing their contracting skills to atrophy. Likewise, the base contracting Marines rarely deploy so, although they are current on the latest regulation changes and newest contracting technology, they are not getting experience with the nuances associated with deploying to a foreign country where contracting for support can be very different than contracting within the United States.

In order to partially combat this situation the three FSSG commanders, to varying degrees as described in Chapter III, have decided to physically locate the FSSG contingency contracting personnel within the RCO collocated aboard the same base as the FSSG, but have opted not to give up full control of those Marines to the RCO director. At various times personality disputes among the base and FSSG commanders have resulted in the FSSG Marines being pulled out of the RCOs and located within the FSSG headquarters. This collocating was done so that FSSG Marines can get experience with performing base support contracts thereby keeping their skills up and reducing the workload on the base Marines. This seems like a complete solution to the problem of keeping the contingency contracting Marines' skills current, however since the RCO

director has little input into who deploys from the FSSG, the director is hesitant to assign work to the FSSG Marines that could improve their skills because they could potentially deploy (or be sent away for military skills training) leaving contracts in various stages of completeness that must be reassigned to another member of the contracting office.

In addition, since only the FSSG Marines typically deploy, the base Marines could go three or four years without having conducted a deployment. Their experience with those nuances of contingency contracting are then limited or outdated at best. The survey results for question 40, “how can the Marine Corps improve its contingency contracting process”, tend to substantiate this concern among the 3044s as 6.55% of the respondents replied that more deployments were needed. The Marines that gave this answer were currently assigned to a base command. In addition, 8.19% of the respondents also indicated that more Marines needed to be sent to the FSSGs. These responses indicate that the base 3044s realize the value of the deployments only the FSSG Marines get to perform and that a larger pool of deployable Marines is needed to reduce the frequency of deployments for the FSSG Marines that has escalated in response to the current operational tempo of the Marines Corps. The survey results to question 35 also indicate that Marines currently in contingency contracting billets are deploying on a very frequent basis. Ten of the respondents reported more than four deployments during their current tour, which is normally three years in length. Two of the respondents to this question reported having done eight or more deployments during this current tour. The normal expectation during a three-year tour in a deploying billet is to do two or three deployments.

A secondary effect of the escalating deployments for the FSSG 3044s is their ability to obtain their DAWIA certification. Survey results indicate 4.92% of the respondents that replied to question 9, “describe any difficulties experienced when trying to attain DAWIA certification Level”, felt that frequent deployments were the reason that they were unable to get their certification. In addition, 23.07% of the respondents to question 20 “difficulties experienced trying to achieve 80 continuous learning points”, replied that they were unable to meet the 80-point minimum due to frequent deployments.

The Air Force and the Army do not make the distinction among contingency contracting and base contracting. All of their personnel are considered to be in a contingency contracting billet. As a result, they are able to evenly distribute deployments among all the members of their enlisted contracting force. This reduces the frequency of deployments, which increases the time between deployments enabling their enlisted personnel more time to attend training and education classes. Air Force personnel are given a wide range of base contracting responsibilities when not deployed because their deployment cycles are much more predictable. When an individual is notified that he will be deploying the flight leader and team leader reassign the departing airman's workload to other members of the team or flight. This organizational structure by the Air Force and the Army allows them to maximize the hands-on work with contracts and deployed experience for their enlisted personnel while also giving them more stability to work on their certification levels. The result is an enlisted contingency contracting force that has a more standardized level of experience and training.

The Marine Corps enlisted contingency contracting force in comparison has a more diverse level of experience and training among its Marines. Those Marines assigned to the FSSGs are more experienced with contingency contracting procedures, but less experienced with base support contracts while those Marines assigned to RCOs have more experience with base support contracts and less experience with contingencies.

The Marine Corps could realize more standardization among its enlisted 3044s by adopting an organizational structure modeled after that of the Air Force and the Army. By combining the FSSG contingency contracting Marines with the base contracting Marines at the three RCOs within the Marine Corps the pool of available Marines to support deployments would essentially double. Deployments could then be rotated among all the Marines within the RCO. This would give individual Marines more time between deployments which would allow them increased opportunities to attend DAU courses, get their college training, and ultimately get their DAWIA certification sooner.

### **C. RANK STRUCTURE**

The current rank structure has also become an issue with members of the 3044 community. This was revealed in the responses to questions 3 and 4 of the survey. Question 3 asked the respondents to indicate whether they felt their current rank was

adequate. Results show that 18% (11) of the respondents indicated that their rank was not adequate. Question 4 then asked those respondents that indicated their rank was not adequate to comment on why they felt their rank was not adequate. Results here show that 45.45% (5) of the respondents indicated their responsibilities and job demands exceed that of peers in other MOSs. In addition, 36.36% (4) of the respondents indicated their current rank was below that required by their billet and 18.18% (2) indicated that they were not taken seriously by senior officers they are required to brief when deployed. A response related to rank was also revealed in the responses to question 44. The results of this question show that 14.75% (9) of the respondents to that question indicated the MOS could be improved by increasing promotion rates. These responses indicate that almost 1/5 of the sample population feel that they should have a higher rank to perform their job and that promotions are too slow.

The DAWIA requirement that enlisted personnel performing contracting within the military have a bachelors degree has created some potential retention problems for the Marine Corps contingency contracting force. Once enlisted personnel receive a bachelor's degree, they are potentially eligible to become commissioned officers. However, since a majority of these Marines will exceed the maximum age limit of 27 years old to receive a commission by the time they complete their degree this option will not be available to them. Many of the young 3044s the researcher spoke with during a recent visit to RCO Southwest realized that with a bachelor's degree they could potentially get out of the Marine Corps and get a job that could compensate them at a higher rate than their enlisted salary. The survey results for question 42 tend to substantiate this opinion. Question 42 asked the respondents to indicate their future intentions after receiving the degree they were currently seeking. Only 39.34% (24) of the respondents were certain they were going to remain on active duty after receiving their degree. In fact, 22.95% (14) were convinced they were going to seek civilian employment after receiving their degree. Also, 26.23% (16) of the respondents were undecided about their future intentions. This could present a problem retaining senior enlisted Marines in the 3044 MOS.

Question 43 asked the respondents to choose among five potential incentives that would be an attractive incentive to keep them on active duty. Respondents chose all the

incentives except “more responsibility”. The overwhelming choice, however, was to bring back the warrant officer program for contracting Marines. Although the researcher was unable to locate any documentation with details about the warrant officer program for contracting, the researcher was told by several senior enlisted 3044s at the 2002 Contracting Conference that there were warrant officers performing contracting in the Marine Corps when they came into the MOS years ago. Responses show 37.70% (23) of the respondents to question 43 chose having a warrant officer program as the most attractive incentive to keeping them on active duty once they received their degree. In addition, the responses to question 44, which asked respondents to describe how they felt their MOS could be improved, revealed an even higher percentage of the survey sample felt that a warrant officer program was necessary. A full 42.62% (26) of the respondents made some mention of the need for a warrant officer program. One respondent, in fact, mentioned in partial response to question 44 that the respondent had the privilege of working with CWO4 Maxam the last warrant officer in the contracting field. Clearly the 3044 population feels strongly that a warrant officer program would be beneficial to the MOS.

In partial response to this rank structure issue, the 3044 Community Management Office at Headquarters Marine Corps is currently conducting a Grade Shape Review (GSR). The purpose of this GSR is to structure the Marine Corps 3044 rank structure to more closely resemble the Air Force structure shown in Figure 6. This pyramid structure prevents too many senior Marines from accumulating at the top of the rank structure and slowing down promotions for the junior Marines below them. In discussions with headquarters personnel involved with this issue, the GSR is not considering incorporating warrant officers into the rank structure for 3044s.

By including another layer of rank in the form of warrant officer billets the Marine Corps would be able to realize an increased promotion rate and be able to upgrade many billets to a higher rank. This would result in 3044s with the higher rank they feel is necessary to do their jobs, while providing an attractive incentive to retain on active duty those Marines that are planning to exit the Marine Corps upon receiving their degree.

#### **D. EDUCATION**

The new DAWIA requirement that enlisted Marines assigned to the contracting field possess a Bachelor's degree and 24 semester hours of business related college courses has been difficult to achieve by all the branches of the military. As outlined in Chapter II, this requirement was in response to the many commissions that have identified a lack of professional development within the military contracting community. Fortunately, this requirement, as contained in Section 808 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, was only in place one year before it was superseded by Section 824 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. Section 824 eased this requirement somewhat by establishing a less stringent education requirement for members of the Armed Forces considered to be in the contingency contracting force. The requirement for contingency contracting personnel is currently to complete at least 24 semester hours of business related college coursework or to pass an examination that demonstrates the skills, knowledge, or abilities comparable to an individual who has completed at least 24 semester credit hours or the equivalent of study in any of the business disciplines it outlines. As a result, the Air Force, Army, and Marine Corps consider all enlisted contracting personnel to be in the contingency contracting force.

Discussions with headquarters personnel during the 2002 Marine Corps Contracting Conference revealed that the Services are attempting to develop a standardized equivalency examination that can be administered to their enlisted contracting personnel to meet the Section 824 option, outlined above, to pass an equivalency exam in lieu of meeting the 24 semester credit hour requirement. Currently, the Services have been unable to develop one comprehensive exam or multiple individual exams that would cover the full 24-semester credit hour requirement. The only avenue available under this option is for an individual to take an equivalency exam given by an accredited college or university that results in the individual being awarded college credit for a course the college gives that meets the requirements for "business" coursework outlined in Section 824. These college level exams are usually difficult to pass and typically result in three or four semester credit hours being awarded. It is very unlikely that an enlisted person with little or no previous college experience would be able to pass



eight separate college level exams in order to meet the 24-semester credit hour requirement. This means the majority of the enlisted personnel must attend college classes to meet this requirement.

The military environment poses some problems for enlisted personnel trying to take college courses to meet this requirement. The first difficulty is that according to DAWIA once personnel are assigned to their contracting position they only have 18 months to meet this requirement. Since most colleges and universities have two semesters per year, or three quarters if operating on the quarter system, an enlisted person with no college credit upon entering the MOS would have to take at least three college classes (typically three or four semester credit classes) per quarter for the three quarter (18 month) period to meet the DAWIA education requirement. Although this might be a heavy part-time college schedule, it is possible if the individual attends college without interruption for the entire 18 months.

In addition to the restrictive time frame allowed to complete the 24 semester credit hours, several additional obstacles exacerbate the difficulty in accomplishing this requirement. In an effort to discover what these obstacles were the survey given to the Marine 3044s asked several questions about education. The first question on education, question 23, asked the respondents to identify the current level of education they possess. Of the respondents, 18.33% (11) indicated they had a baccalaureate degree and 25.00% (15) indicated they currently had an associate degree. The remaining 56.67% (34) indicated they had a high school diploma. The responses to question 23 are encouraging in that 42.62% (26) of the respondents have at least an Associate's degree.

However, the indications of trouble meeting the DAWIA education requirement for enlisted Marines can be found in the responses to question 24. This question asked the respondents to indicate whether they meet the 24 semester credit hours required under DAWIA. The responses indicate that almost half, 46.67% (28), do not meet this education requirement. Subsequent survey questions 25 through 29 shed some light on why Marines are unable to meet this requirement.

Since one of the goals of the Marine Corps is to select Marines for the 3044 MOS that already have some college credits under their wing, the researcher asked question 25

to determine how successful the Marine Corps has been at selecting Marines for the 3044 MOS that already have some college. The results of this question show that none of the Marines had 24 credits in business related college coursework prior to attaining the 3044 MOS and only one Marine had more than 12 credits. This indicates how difficult it is to bring enlisted Marines into the MOS that already meet the education requirement. It is almost certain that Marines new to the MOS will be required to attend college in order to meet this requirement.

The researcher then asked question 26 to determine how successful Marines have been at taking college courses after receiving the MOS. Only one respondent indicated having been able to take the full 24 semester credit hours of college work after attaining the MOS. This highlights how difficult it is for these Marines to attend college classes after they are in the MOS. As a result, not only is it difficult for the Marine Corps to select Marines for the 3044 MOS that already have college work completed, it is just as difficult to get Marines through college courses once they are in the MOS.

Question 27 then asked the respondents if attending college during the workday was made available to them. The results indicate that 84.48% (49) of the respondents do not attend college during the workday. This means that Marines are expected to work a full day at work and then take college classes at night. Since a standard three-credit college course means three hours of class time per week per course, a Marine with little or no college prior to entering the MOS might have to attend college every weeknight. This requires a lot of determination on the individual's part to maintain this rigorous schedule for 18 months. If Marines were allowed to attend college classes during the day, they could potentially complete their college requirements in a much shorter period of time.

In an effort to determine the most common problems encountered by Marines trying to attend college courses, the researcher asked question 28. This question gave the respondents an opportunity to identify the difficulties they experienced. The most common problem cited was frequent deployments, which 21.31% (13) of the respondents listed. The next most frequently cited problem was the lack of college courses available, which 14.75% (9) of the respondents gave as a problem they encountered. Other

comments ranged from long work hours to lost credits when transferring to a new duty station. Two additional problems cited were conflicts with DAU courses and expensive books.

The Air Force has been able to address some of these difficulties for its enlisted personnel through its Community College of the Air Force (CCAF). This college administered by the Air Force offers many of the business college courses listed by DAWIA as satisfying the educational requirements. Since the campus is dispersed across the Air Force bases, students that transfer from one base to another do not lose their credits. Since the Air Force teaches its enlisted personnel DAU equivalent courses as an MOS school through its CDC courses, there is less conflict with having to send personnel TAD to DAU courses potentially disrupting college courses. The Air Force also has a separate education program that covers the cost of expensive books for enlisted Air Force personnel.

Survey Question 39 asked the Marine respondents that served with enlisted contracting personnel from other Services to rate the other Service's education opportunities as compared to their own. An overwhelming 73.07% (19) indicated that the opportunities provided by the other Services were better. The results of this survey question indicate that the Marine Corps could benefit from the use of the Air Force CDC courses, developing an improved tuition assistance program that covers the cost of books, improving the selection and standardization of college courses offered aboard Marine Corps bases, and allowing Marines to attend school during part of the workday. These changes could go a long way toward improving the number of Marines that meet the education requirement as outlined under DAWIA and reversing the feeling among Marines that other Services have better education opportunities than the Marine Corps.

## **E. TRAINING**

Once accepted for a transfer into the 3044 MOS, the first training requirement that enlisted personnel must complete is a six-month OJT period. Marines are normally sent to a Regional Contracting Office to complete this OJT. As mentioned in Chapter III, this is a very loosely structured program within the Marine Corps. There is no formal structure associated with what is covered during this OJT period. Survey question 14 indicates that there is no standardized time frame for completing the OJT period. When

the respondents were asked how long they spent in an OJT status, the results ranged from one month to more than 10 months. Although 65.57% (40) of the respondents indicated they spent six months in an OJT status, 13.11% (8) of the respondents replied that they spent more than 10 months in an OJT status. Currently there is no guide or format to follow when conducting this OJT training. Without a standardized OJT training plan it cannot be certain that all Marines leave the OJT period with the same set of skills. For example, what one Marine is being taught at RCO Southwest may be completely different from what a Marine is being taught at RCO Okinawa - and is completely dependent upon the individual assigned to conduct the OJT.

In contrast, the Air Force has developed a comprehensive checklist described in Chapter III that must be signed, not only by the individual being trained and the person conducting the training, but also by a certifier trained to certify that the training received meets the minimum level expected of all Air Force OJTs. The Air Force can be certain that each of its enlisted personnel have the same set of skills upon completion of the OJT period. This checklist is continued throughout the Air Force personnel's contracting career. The Marine Corps could standardize the training received by all 3044s during their OJT period by developing a standardized and documented program that ensures those contracting skills determined to be the most valuable for new entrants are taught to all 3044s during their OJT period.

The researcher also discovered, after looking at the results of survey questions 7 and 8, that 50.80% (31) of the respondents did not currently meet the DAWIA certification level required by their billet. The survey then asked those respondents that did not meet the DAWIA certification level for their billet to indicate the difficulties they experienced when trying to attain their certification level. Question 9 revealed that 37.70% (23) of the respondents indicated that the most common problem preventing them from attaining their DAWIA certification was difficulty getting into DAU courses. After attending the 2002 Marine Corps Contracting Conference, the researcher found that a major contributor to the difficulties Marines experience when trying to take DAU courses has to do with the way DAU apportions its course seats. DAU essentially allocates a certain number of seats to the Army, Air Force, and Navy.

The Marine Corps does not get its own allocation of course seats to manage. Marines must apply for and get a seat under the Navy's allocation. The most frequent problem with this system is that once a Marine submits a request for one of the Navy seats there is no way of knowing if it has been taken by an acquisition member of the Navy until DAU notification is sent via e-mail one or two weeks prior to the start of the course. If a Marine receives notification that the course was full, that Marine must go through the registration process again for the next available course. Marines at the contracting conference were very frustrated with this system, some indicating that they had been dropped several times from the same DAU course they were attempting to take.

The Marine Corps has made some progress at getting this situation corrected. This year the Marine Corps was granted approval by DAU to have three CON 234 Contingency Contracting courses taught aboard Marine Corps installations exclusively for Marines. DAU instructors will conduct two courses at Camp Lejeune and one course at Camp Pendleton during Fiscal Year 2003. This was requested by the Marine Corps to alleviate some of the backlog of Marines that need to attend this course. This will temporarily ease the backlog, but a more permanent solution needs to be found to ensure Marine 3044s get the training they require. If the Marine Corps had its own allocation of DAU seats, separate from the Navy, that Headquarters Marines Corps could monitor, Marines would have a better chance of getting into the DAU courses they needed.

The researcher also wanted to know what kind of internal contracting training was available to Marines other than DAU courses and OJT. Question 21 asked the respondents if their office/unit/section had a training Non-commissioned Officer (NCO). Most Marine units appoint one individual within an organic unit to plan, coordinate, and document the training that is being accomplished within that unit. Responses to question 21 indicate that 59.32% (35) of the Marines surveyed did not have a training NCO appointed within their office/unit/section. Part of the responsibilities of the training NCO is to be knowledgeable about the training standards for the MOSs within the unit and ensure that established training objectives are accomplished. The lack of a training NCO at so many of the Marine units further indicates that training may not be conducted as efficiently and effectively throughout the Marine Corps as it could be if each unit had an

individual tasked with ensuring that Marines within that unit were getting the training they required.

The researcher also wanted to know what kind of training was being conducted at those units that did have a training NCO. Question 22 asked respondents to indicate what kind of training was included in their annual training plan. Although the responses listed 25 distinct topics that were covered in training plans, 17 of them came from just three of the respondents. This indicates that some units are doing very good job of training over a wide variety of contracting topics while some units are not doing as good a job of training their personnel on relevant contracting issues.

The Air Force AFSC 6C0X1 Contracting Career Field Education and Training Plan (CFETP) represents a standard training plan that all Air Force personnel are expected to follow. The CFETP not only describes the type of training and how it is to be conducted, it also indicates minimum time periods that should be devoted to each topic and requires that the training be certified by a trained certifier. This process ensures that when Air Force enlisted personnel are given a certain skill level that the Air Force can positively identify the skills those individuals have mastered.

If a similar system were to be adopted by the Marine Corps, Marines would have a more uniform level of training among its enlisted personnel. In addition, supervisors would be able to tell from the documentation what training newly arriving individuals required and could focus on that training first. When the time comes for a deployment, supervisors would also be able to make better personnel assignments to ensure that Marines sent out alone were capable of performing their mission. A well-documented training record could also be used to improve performance ratings of individual Marines and assist with the selection process for promotions.

The researcher also made a surprising discovery among the responses to question 22. Not one of the respondents indicated that any kind of contingency contracting specific training was being conducted within any of the contracting offices within the Marine Corps. All of the topics listed were important topics and necessary for the conduct of contingency contracting, but the researcher was surprised that no mention was made of training that would assist Marines when deploying to a foreign country to

conduct contracting actions. Since the primary mission of enlisted personnel and commissioned officers in the Marine Corps contingency force is to provide contracting support to deployed Marine units, it would seem that periodic contingency training, in addition to that received in CON 234, would be a valuable asset to these Marines.

The Air Force contingency contracting training program described in Chapter III, that is conducted one day per month, appears to be a valuable tool to keep contracting personnel engaged in thinking about the nuances of conducting contracting actions outside the continental United States. The level of importance placed on conducting contingency contracting training in the Air Force is reflected in the Top Dollar competition that has developed to showcase those skills.

Marine contingency contracting personnel do conduct much of the training that is included in the Air Force contingency contracting training program, such as NBC training, weapons training, and physical fitness training. However, the researcher could not find indications that the Marine contingency contracting force had a method in place to conduct scenario-based contingency contracting training. Both the Air Force and the Marine Corps are adept at capturing after-action reports from the contracting personnel that are sent on deployments. The Air Force utilizes this information contained in those after-action reports to create scenario based training modules for its personnel. These training modules are used to place contracting personnel in fictitious situations that require them to devise a solution to a problem in a set amount of time. This creates an active means of passing on the information learned from previous deployments vice the passive means of just collecting this information in files and expecting contingency contracting personnel to sift through it prior to deploying in an effort to locate any valuable information it might contain.

The Marine Corps could not only replicate this model used by the Air Force, it could also easily get access to scenarios already created by the Air Force and use them as training tools for Marine contingency contracting personnel. Air Force training personnel the researcher spoke with were excited about the prospect of both sharing their information with and learning from the Marine Corps.

The standardized and well-documented OJT and career training, DAU equivalent courses, specifically allocated DAU seats, certified trainers, and scenario based training could be part of the reason that 53.84% (14) of the respondents to question 38 indicated that training received by other Services was “better” than that received by Marine Corps contingency contracting personnel. By adopting some of these practices the Marine Corps might realize both improved training among its personnel and better support to deployed Marine forces.

#### **F. EMPLOYMENT**

As described in Chapter III, the Marine Corps deploys the majority of its contingency contracting personnel from the three FSSGs within the Marine Corps. Also as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter this gives the FSSG commander positive control and flexibility regarding who gets deployed to support an exercise. The researcher wanted to know what affect this had on the enlisted contingency contracting force. Survey question 30 asked the respondents if they had been given the opportunity to serve in a contingency contracting billet. The responses to this question indicated that 44.07% (26) had been able to serve in a contingency contracting billet while 55.93% (33) responded that they had not had an opportunity.

Question 31 then asked the respondents that indicated “no” they had not had an opportunity to serve in a contingency contracting billet to briefly describe why. The most common response at 37.93% (11) indicated that a lack of a sufficient number of contingency contracting billets prevented them from serving in a contingency contracting billet. Another 31.03% (9) replied that they were still in their OJT period, and the next highest response was due to a lack of certification given by 20.68% (6) of the respondents. This indicates that the policy of only deploying Marines from the FSSG billets leaves some Marines that would deploy if they had the chance, unable to do so.

Question 32 then asked the respondents that did not have an opportunity to deploy if they felt they were less competitive for promotion. This question was designed so that only those Marines that responded “no” to question 30 would reply, however, all of the respondents chose to answer the question. The results still capture the researcher’s intent, which was to find out if the 3044s perceived not serving in a contingency contracting billet as making them less competitive for promotion. The results indicate that 57.50%



(23) of the respondents felt they were not as competitive for promotion if they did not serve in a contingency contracting billet as their counterparts who did.

The researcher then asked question 34 to discover how equitably deployments are distributed among Marines in their most recent contingency contracting billets. The wide variations among the responses to this question indicate that deployments are not equally distributed. Some of the respondents indicated having done no deployments while two of the respondents indicated they did more than eight deployments during their most recent deployment. Some of the variation observed could be the result of the time period in which the respondents served in the contingency contracting billet. Certain periods in the recent past involved more Marine deployments than others. However, the implication remains that deployments may not be equitably distributed among the contingency contracting billets within the FSSGs.

One final thought on the employment of 3044s has to do with the level of experience deploying Marines have when they deploy. Although Marines are typically sent to a base contracting billet for at least 2 years after completing OJT prior to being assigned to a contingency contracting billet, four of the respondents to survey question 15 indicated that they were assigned to a contingency contracting billet following completion of the OJT period. The less formalized system of making assignments within the Marine Corps results in Marines being sent on missions with varying levels of experience.

In contrast, the Air Force use of skill levels to categorize personnel according to their experience level and the practice of deploying lower skill levels with senior skill levels through the use of Unit Type Codes (UTC) listed in Appendix C ensures a more standardized level of experience among deployed contracting personnel. The Air Force also utilizes a computerized listed of personnel to more equitably spread the deployments out among its contracting personnel.

To summarize the issues regarding the employment of enlisted contingency contracting personnel presented in this section, Marines equate deployments with increased potential for promotion. Also, the limited number of FSSG billets means that more Marines want to deploy than are able to deploy and those Marines that are in FSSG

billets are not as equitably deployed as they could be if the Marine Corps combined the FSSG and RCO billets and then implemented a Marine Corps wide system to track the number of deployments each Marine conducts. Deployments could then be more equitably assigned to the contingency contracting population.

**G. CHAPTER SUMMARY**

This chapter analyzed the information contained in Chapters II through IV to evaluate the perception of the current Marine Corps contingency contracting force in relation to contingency contracting practices utilized by other branches of the military. The analysis in this chapter forms the basis for the conclusions and recommendations contained in the following chapter.

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## **VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. INTRODUCTION**

This thesis has presented a thorough overview of the issues facing the 3044 enlisted contingency contracting community. It began by developing an historical perspective of contingency contracting and then presented some current reasons why the use of contingency contracting is likely to continue into the foreseeable future. The focus then became the evolution of DoD regulations that govern the contingency contracting force. Chapter III then explored the different approaches taken by the Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Navy in the utilization of enlisted personnel to perform their contingency contracting mission. Chapter IV presented the results of a survey the researcher conducted of the 3044 community. The data collected in Chapters II through IV were then analyzed in Chapter V. The analysis produced the conclusions and recommendations contained in this chapter.

### **B. CONCLUSIONS**

#### **1. Through DAWIA, Congress is taking steps to change the “unprofessional” image of the Acquisition Workforce by imposing Training and Education requirements upon all the members of the Acquisition Community**

This study has shown that contingency contracting is a dynamic process that has been a vital part of United States military operations since the American Revolution. Given the current environment of military operations, described in Chapter II, the utilization of contingency contracting will not only continue, but will likely escalate as the DoD attempts to become more efficient at providing logistical support to its deployed operating forces. As the use of contingency contracting increases, so does the cost of providing this type of support, which increasingly draws the attention of oversight organizations within the Federal Government. The result of this oversight has been increased legislation designed to ensure that DoD personnel performing duties in the realm of contracting are educated and trained to be a responsible and professional workforce capable of making sound financial decisions when given fiduciary responsibility for American taxpayer dollars.

**2. The Military Services are finding it difficult to meet these new training and educational requirements, established by DAWIA, for their enlisted personnel**

The DAWIA legislation has become more demanding in recent years by establishing college education requirements, in addition to the extensive DAWIA training requirements, that must be met by enlisted personnel serving in contracting positions. Unlike commissioned officers that are required to have a bachelor's degree, enlisted personnel are not expected to have college level training. As a result, many enlisted personnel that enter the contracting force either have no college experience, or have only taken a few classes. The result is that enlisted personnel are expected to attend college courses while being capable of deploying to support contingency operations. Doing both is proving to be difficult, if not impossible, to accomplish within the 18-month time period established by DAWIA to meet the training and education requirements for a given DAWIA certification level.

**3. The Marine Corps and the Air Force are more dependent upon enlisted personnel to perform their contingency contracting mission than the Navy and the Army**

Each of the Military Services has developed a unique response to this difficult situation. The Navy has decided for the present not to employ enlisted contingency contracting personnel. The Army, realizing the important contribution enlisted contingency contracting personnel can make, is in the process of developing a permanent contracting MOS for its enlisted personnel. The Marine Corps and the Air Force are heavily dependent upon enlisted contingency contracting personnel. A comparison of the ratio of officer to enlisted contingency contracting personnel reveals that the Marine Corps has a ratio of approximately 1:6 while the Air Force has a ratio of 1:5. If the way the Marines are structured is taken into consideration, the FSSGs - which contain the contingency contracting billets - have a ratio of 1:8.

**4. The Marine Corps could emulate some of the practices of the Air Force to improve the career development of 3044s**

Although the relative size difference would make it difficult for the Marine Corps to fully adopt the system used by the Air Force, the Marine Corps could develop similar

practices that would improve the effectiveness of its contingency contracting force. This study specifically evaluated the Military Services in regard to their structure, training, education, and deployment of enlisted personnel to determine the impact each was having on personnel development among the Services. The analysis shows that personnel development within the Marine Corps contingency contracting force can be improved by implementing some of the recommendations found in Section C of this chapter.

**5. The current structure of the Marine Corps contracting force impedes the efforts of enlisted personnel to meet their DAWIA requirements**

The current structural approach taken by the Marine Corps of segregating its contingency contracting personnel into a separate command from its base contracting personnel makes it more difficult for enlisted 3044s to meet their DAWIA requirements. Limiting the number of deployable 3044s to just those in the FSSG billets means those Marines are called upon to do multiple deployments. While these Marines are deployed they are unable to attend college or DAU courses required to meet their DAWIA requirements.

**6. Training and education opportunities afforded 3044s could be improved by implementing programs similar to those of other Services**

The Air Force has a comprehensive training program that specifically targets the unique challenges of contingency contracting. The Air Force also has well-established training goals and tracking devices to ensure that all its enlisted personnel have a standardized level of competency upon completion of OJT and throughout their career. In addition, the Air Force covers the entire cost of college courses for its enlisted personnel. Currently, the Marine Corps does not match the Air Force in these areas.

**C. RECOMMENDATIONS**

**1. The Marine Corps Should Alter the 3044 Organizational Structural**

The Marine Corps should combine the enlisted contingency contracting personnel at each of the three FSSGs with their counterparts at the three collocated RCOs. Under the administrative control of the RCO director, this larger pool of enlisted contingency contracting personnel would provide a more diverse base from which to support both base contracting operations and contingency operations. The RCO director would be

tasked with providing contracting personnel to support contingencies in the region previously covered by the FSSG contingency contracting personnel. These Marines could then be detached from the RCO and attached to the FSSG, or Joint unit requesting contingency contracting support, and returned to the RCO upon completion of the contingency or exercise. This would allow the RCO director to ensure a more standardized level of training and deployed experience among the 3044s within that RCO. All 3044s assigned to that RCO would have the opportunity to deploy and FSSG personnel would be able to get more hands on experience with contracting actions in the garrison environment. This would also make it easier to synchronize deployments, DAU training courses and college classes to improve the ability of individuals to accomplish all three of these to the maximum extent possible.

**2. The Marine Corps Should Consider Reviving the Contracting Warrant Officer Program**

With this larger pool of contingency contracting personnel at each of the three RCOs, the Marine Corps should consider creating warrant officer billets at each RCO to improve the training and readiness of the contingency contracting force. This would provide a positive retention incentive to keep some of the brightest and most aggressive enlisted personnel from leaving the Marine Corps to pursue a career in the civilian market. This could also help create the more professional workforce that is the underlying goal of the DAWIA legislation.

**3. Improvements Should be Made to the Education Opportunities Available to Enlisted 3044s**

Meeting the 24 semester credit hours of college level business coursework has proven to be a challenge for the Marine Corps, as well as the other Military Services. Since time to attend college courses and the availability of classes were the leading reasons Marines surveyed gave for not being able to meet this 24 hour minimum, the Marine Corps should consider allowing Marines to attend college courses during the normal workday. OJT could be conducted during half of the day and college courses conducted during the other half of the day. This would increase the possibility of enlisted personnel meeting this requirement within the timeframe established by DAWIA.

The Marine Corps should also consider adopting a program similar to that used by the Air Force that pays for all the expenses associated with college courses to include books and fees. Currently the Marine Corps policy of only covering the tuition costs creates the potential for enlisted Marines to delay enrolling in college courses or attend courses without all the necessary materials, if the cost of books is perceived to be exorbitant.

**4. Improve the Training Available to the 3044 Community**

The researcher discovered during the survey and the researcher's attendance at the 2002 Marine Corps Contracting Conference that Marines needed better training. The dependence on the Navy for DAU seats, the frequent lack of funding to attend DAU courses and the limited number of DAU course offerings has been a major source of irritation for the Marine Corps contracting force. The Marine Corps should pursue getting its own quota of DAU course seats that could be managed at the Community Management Office at Headquarters Marine Corps. This would ensure that the Marine Corps has the opportunity to get its personnel the training needed to meet the DAWIA certification standards. The Marine Corps should also explore the possibility of sending Marines to DAU equivalent courses such as the CDC courses taught by the Air Force.

**5. Develop a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for Contingency Contracting Training**

Developing a Standing Operating Procedure (SOP) for contingency contracting training would provide a standardized level of expectations among Marine contingency contracting personnel. This SOP should address the issues that should be covered during the OJT period and provide a means of documenting and tracking a 3044's progress towards meeting those standards. This should not only be limited to the OJT period, but should span the Marine's career outlining all the training milestones that must be met prior to progressing up the rank structure.



**6. Establish a Training Office Within the Marine Corps Headquarters to Develop Contingency Contracting Training.**

The scenario-based training being conducted by the Air Force is a useful tool to help develop the mental awareness of enlisted contingency contracting personnel. The Marine Corps should designate a position within the Marine Corps Headquarters to collect after-action reports from contingency operations. This information could then be used to generate training modules that could be sent to all the Marine Corps contracting offices as training aids to improve contingency contracting situational awareness throughout the force. This could also be done in conjunction with Air Force personnel to create a Joint program.

**7. The Marine Corps Should Evaluate the Potential Benefits of Developing an Employment System for Deploying 3044s**

The Air Force currently uses a system of deploying its contracting personnel that utilizes a skill level indicator. Although a system such as this would likely prove to be too cumbersome for the smaller population of Marine Corps contingency contracting personnel, it does provide a model that should be studied by the Marine Corps to evaluate how well Marines are deployed in accordance with their capabilities. If the Marine Corps could adopt some of the principles of this system, it might prove to be useful in ensuring Marines that are sent on deployments are fully prepared for the situations they are likely to be confronted with when outside the continental United States.

**D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The objectives of this study were guided by one primary research question and five secondary research questions. After collecting data, analyzing those data, and drawing conclusions from the analysis, responses to these research questions can now be provided.

**1. Answer to Primary Research Question**

What effect has the changing contingency contracting environment had on personnel career development within the United States Marine Corps contingency contracting force and how might career development policies and processes be improved?

The background information contained in Chapter II revealed that the contingency contracting environment is a dynamic one that has been around since the Revolutionary War and appears to be growing in importance to the U.S. Military Forces due to the many environmental factors described in Chapter II. The impact this environment has had on personnel career development within the Marine Corps was evaluated through literature reviews and personal interviews contained in Chapter III and the survey results presented in Chapter IV. Recommendations for improving career development policies and procedures within the Marine Corps are presented in the recommendations contained in Section C of this chapter.

## **2. Answers to Secondary Research Questions**

### **How is career development currently being addressed within the United States Marine Corps contingency contracting community?**

Chapters III and IV presented the details surrounding the current career development approach being taken by the Marine Corps. The analysis of this information was presented in Chapter V and revealed that the flexible Marine Corps approach to organizational structure supports unity of command, but creates inefficiencies in training, educating, and employing enlisted contingency contracting personnel. The researcher focused on the three FSSG units within the Marine Corps. The Marine Corps is currently addressing these issues through a grade shape review, currently being conducted at Headquarters Marine Corps and a comprehensive Campaign Plan that establishes goals to improve efficiency in some of these areas. Recommendations are made in this chapter that could assist in these efforts.

### **What can be learned from effective career development practices within other Military Services?**

Chapter III described the current contingency contracting practices within the Marine Corps, Air Force, Army, and Navy. The information presented focused on the structure, education, training, and employment of enlisted contracting personnel. Since the Navy does not utilize enlisted personnel for contingency contracting and the Army is restructuring its enlisted contracting force, most of the useful information gathered from this chapter came from the Air Force. The Air Force has developed several tools and

procedures that could benefit the Marine Corps contracting force. These lessons learned are captured in the recommendations made in Section C of this chapter.

**What training and education issues are affecting enlisted contingency contracting personnel and their career opportunities?**

Chapter IV of this thesis presented responses to several research questions that were designed to answer this question. The results indicate that enlisted personnel in 3044 MOS, like all the Military Services, are having difficulty meeting the DAWIA education requirement for all members of the contingency contracting force to have 24 semester credit hours in business related courses. Frequent deployments, availability of college classes, tuition assistance, and long work hours were the primary issues affecting 3044s efforts to meet this education requirement. Training requirements under DAWIA were also listed as difficult to meet with availability of DAU courses topping the list of issues preventing enlisted personnel from meeting their training requirements under DAWIA. Training and education difficulties were both listed as reasons for enlisted personnel not being certified under the DAWIA standards.

**Should the personnel structure of the Marine Corps contracting offices be changed to accommodate improved career development opportunities?**

After comparing the Marine Corps approach to structuring its contingency contracting offices with that of the Air Force and the Army, it appears that combining all enlisted personnel within a geographical area into one pool of contingency contracting personnel under one command structure creates an environment that has the potential for improved training, education, employment, and promotion opportunities for enlisted contingency contracting personnel. Therefore, one of the recommendations contained in Section C of this chapter recommends that the Marine Corps combine the contracting personnel from the FSSG offices with the personnel from the RCO offices into one pool of contingency contracting personnel under the direction of the RCO director at each of the three major RCOs. It is also recommended that the Marine Corps evaluate the potential to revive the warrant officer program it once had for the contracting community to create retention incentives for enlisted personnel.

**What changes are necessary to improve personnel career development within the Marine Corps contingency contracting force?**

This question is answered in the recommendations contained in Section C of this chapter. Adopting these recommendations could improve the career development of enlisted contingency contracting personnel while improving the level of support these Marines are able to provide to deployed units.

**E. RECOMMENDED AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH**

After conducting this research the author discovered additional areas of research within this same area of study that were outside the scope of this thesis. The following topics could provide useful information for the contingency contracting community.

1. Regionalization has become a buzzword at Headquarters Marine Corps of late. New digital contracting tools, the use of contract bundling, and personnel shortages are changing the landscape of Marine Corps contracting offices. An analysis could be conducted that would evaluate the number of Marine Corps contracting offices, their volume of contracts, and personnel support issues to determine the most cost-effective means of organizing Marine Corps contracting personnel that is efficient yet meets the needs of Marine Corps customers.

2. Perform a cost/benefit analysis of providing contingency contracting support with Government civilian personnel vice military personnel. The growing use of Government civilian employees to perform the contingency contracting missions might have an effect on the future personnel needs of contingency contracting offices within the Marine Corps and other branches of the U.S. Military.

3. There are currently units within the Marine Corps that outsource their contracting needs. A study of these units could be conducted to determine how well these outside agencies provide the logistical support required by the military units they serve. In essence, is it more cost effective for the Marine Corps to outsource contracting than to retain this function as a military core competency?

4. Develop a standardized career development plan for Marine Corps enlisted contracting personnel. This plan should include clearly stated goals and objectives that are relevant and measurable. A method of documentation should be included that permits

both contracting personnel and their supervisors to track individual progress toward career goals. This would go a long way to standardize the level of training common to all enlisted contracting personnel.

## APPENDIX A. COMMISSIONED OFFICER BILLETS

Title	Grade	Command	Location
Contracting Officer	Major	Policy & Oversight Branch, HQMC	Washington DC
Contracting Officer	Major	Policy & Oversight Branch, HQMC	Washington DC
Regional Contracting Officer	Major	Marine Corps Base Camp Butler	Okinawa, Japan
Regional Contracting Officer	Major	Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune	North Carolina
Regional Contracting Officer	Major	Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton	California
Regional Contracting Officer	Major	Marine Corps Support Activity	Missouri
Contracting Officer	Major	Marine Corps Systems Command	Virginia
Contracting Officer	Major	Marine Corps Logistics Base	Georgia
Contracting Officer *	Major	Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle Program Office	Virginia
Regional Contracting Officer	Captain	Marine Corps Base 29 Palms	California
Regional Contracting Officer	Captain	MCRD Parris Island	South Carolina
Regional Contracting Officer	Captain	MCRD San Diego	California
Regional Contracting Officer	Captain	MARFORRES	Louisiana
Contracting Officer	Captain	Blount Island Command	Florida
Contingency Contracting Officer	Captain	1 <sup>st</sup> FSSG	California
Contingency Contracting Officer	Captain	2 <sup>nd</sup> FSSG	North Carolina
Contingency Contracting Officer	Captain	3 <sup>rd</sup> FSSG	Okinawa, Japan
Contracting Officer	Major	I MEF	California
Contracting Officer	Major	II MEF	North Carolina

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## APPENDIX B. ENLISTED 3044 BILLETS

Command MCC	T/O	Billet Description	L/N	BRN	Current T/O Structure
<b>MCC 008 HQ-LB</b>					
MGYSGT	5103	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0054	M	1
GYSGT	5103	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	0055A	M	0
SSGT	5103	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	0055B	M	2
GYSGT	5103	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	5683	R	1
GYSGT	5114	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	0244	M	1
Total					4

### MCC 012 QUANTICO

MSGT	7411	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	1491	M	1
GYSGT	7411	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1499	M	1
SSGT	7411	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1522	M	1
SSGT	7411	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	1522A	M	1
SGT	7411	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1522	M	0
SGT	7411	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1522B	M	0
Total					4

### MCC 013 MCB CAMLEJ

MGYSGT	7511	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	????	M	0
MSGT	7511	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	2352	M	1
GYSGT	7511	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	2373	M	1
GYSGT	7511	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2383A	R	1
GYSGT	7511	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	2384K	M	1
SSgt	7511	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2384K	M	0
SSgt	7511	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2384?	M	0
SGT	7511	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2367	M	1
SGT	7511	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2376	M	1
SGT	7511	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2382	M	2
SGT	7511	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2384D	M	1
Total					9

### MCC 014 MCB CAMPEN

MGYSGT	7511	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	????	M	0
MSGT	7511	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	????	M	0
GYSGT	7611	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	1980	M	1
GYSGT	7611	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	1986	M	1
SSGT	7611	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	0335	R	1
SSGT	7611	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	1994	M	1
SSGT	7611	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	0515?	M	0
SGT	7611	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	1987	M	1
SGT	7611	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	1995	M	1
SGT	7611	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	2002	M	1
SGT	7611	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	0519?	M	0
Total					6



Command MCC	T/O	Billet Description	L/N	BRN	Current T/O Structure
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#### MCC 015 MCB CAMLEJ

GYSGT	7711	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0782A	M	1
SSGT	7711	PROCUREMENT SPEC	0784A	M	1
SGT	7711	PROCUREMENT SPEC	0782D	M	1
SGT	7711	BPA ADMINISTRATOR	0785C	M	1
SGT	7711	PROCUREMENT SPEC	0785G	M	1
Total					5

#### MCC 016 MCRD/ERR

MSGT	7311A	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	5175	M	1
GYSGT	7311A	PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC	5173	M	1
SGT	7311A	PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC	5179	M	2
Total					4

#### MCC 017 MCRD/WRR

SSGT	7211	PURCHASE & CONTRACT SPEC	0515	M	1
SGT	7211	PURCHASE & CONTRACT SPEC	0519	M	1
Total					2

#### MCC 019 MCLB BARSTOW

MSGT	7010C	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0248	M	1
SSGT	7010C	PURCHASING/CONTRACT SPEC	0827	M	1
MSGT	7010C	PURC/CONT CLERK	6358A	R	1
GYSGT	7010C	PURC/CONT CLERK	6363A	R	1
SGT	7010C	PURC/CONT CLERK	6363B	R	1
SGT	7010C	PURC/CONT CLERK	6363C	R	2
GYSGT	7010C	PURC/CONT SPECIALIST	6374A	R	1
SGT	7010C	PURC/CONT SPECIALIST	6376B	R	3
GYSGT	7010C	CONTRACT SPECIALIST	6382A	R	1
SGT	7010C	PURC/CONT CLERK	6382B	R	4
SSGT	7010C	PURC/CONT CLERK	6382C	R	2
Total					2

#### MCC 022 MCAS CHERRYPT

GYSGT	8340	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	????	M	1
GYSGT	8340	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	????	M	1
SGT	8340	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	????	M	0
Total					2

#### MCC 023 MCAS MIRAMAR

MSGT	8365	CONTRACT SPEC	3904	M	1
GYSGT	8365	CONTRACT SPEC	3904	M	0
SSGT	8365	CONTRACT SPEC	3905	M	1
Total					1

Command MCC	T/O	Billet Description	L/N	BRN	Current T/O Structure
<b>MCC 027 MCAS YUMA</b>					
SSGT	8361	CONTRACT SPEC	????	M	1
Total					1
<b>MCC 028 MCMWTC</b>					
SSGT	7671	PRCOUREMENT SPECIALIST	0108	M	1
Total					1
<b>MCC 044 IWAKUNI</b>					
GYSGT	8321	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	3682	M	1
Total					1
<b>MCC 063 MCLB ALBANY</b>					
MGYSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SUP CHIEF	1012	M	1
MSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1014	M	1
GYSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1013	M	1
GYSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1015	M	1
SSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	0697	M	1
SSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1016	M	1
SGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1017	M	0
SGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1017	M	1
GYSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1092	R	2
SSGT	7010A	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	1093	R	1
Total					10
<b>MCC 066 MCLB ALBANY</b>					
SGT	7010B	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	3531A	M	5
Total					5
<b>MCC 070 MARCORSYSCOM</b>					
SSGT	5055A	CONTRACT SPECIALIST	0336	M	1
Total					1
<b>MCC 092 MCB CAMP BUTLER</b>					
MGYSGT	7803	CONTRACTING CHIEF	0043	M	1
GYSGT	7803	CONTRACT SPEC	0055	M	1
GYSGT	7803	CONTRACT SPEC	0075	M	1
SSGT	7803	CONTRACT SPEC	0057	M	1
SSGT	7803	PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN	0072	M	1
SSGT	7803	CONTRACT SPEC	0077	M	1
SGT	7803	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	0051	M	1
SGT	7803	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	0062	M	1
SGT	7803	PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN	0072	M	0
SGT	7803	PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN	0073	M	1
SGT	7803	PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN	0084	M	1
Total					10

Command MCC	T/O	Billet Description	L/N	BRN	Current T/O Structure
<b>MCC 110 MARFORPAC</b>					
GYSGT	4929N	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0075	M	1
SGT	4929N	PURCHASING CLERK	0080	M	1
SGT	4929N	PURCHASING CLERK	0082	M	1
Total					3

<b>MCC 111 MARFORLANT</b>					
GYSGT	4957P	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0075	M	1
SGT	4957P	PURCHASING SPECILIAST	0080	M	1
Total					2

<b>MCC 151 2nd FSSG</b>					
GYSGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0137	M	1
SSGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0138	M	1
SSGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0139	M	1
SSGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0140	M	1
SSGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0141	M	0
SSGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0142	M	0
SGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0141	M	1
SGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0142	M	1
SGT	3321X	PROCUREMENT MAN	0143	M	1
SGT	3321X	PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK	0144	M	1
Total					8

<b>MCC 169 1st FSSG</b>					
GYSGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0121	M	1
SSGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0123	M	1
SSGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0125	M	1
SSGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0126	M	1
SGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0127	M	0
SGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0128	M	0
SGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0127	M	1
SGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0128	M	1
SGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0129	M	1
SGT	3321F	PROCUREMENT MAN	0105	M	0
SGT	3512F	PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK	0105	M	1
Total					8

<b>MCC 1C2 3d FSSG</b>					
GYSGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	0121	M	1
SSGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0123	M	1
SSGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0125	M	1
SSGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0126	M	1
SSGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0127	M	0
SGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0127	M	1
SSGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0130?	M	0
SGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0128	M	1
SGT	3321G	PROCUREMENT MAN	0129	M	1

Command					Current
MCC	T/O	Billet Description	L/N	BRN	T/O Structure
				Total	7

#### MCC 1DH 4TH MEB

GYSGT	????	CONTRACTING CHIEF	????	M	0
SSGT	????	CONTRACTING CHIEF	0063	M	0
				Total	0

#### MCC 1FY MARFORSOU

GYSGT	????	CONTRACTING CHIEF	????	M	1
SSGT	????	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	????	M	1
				Total	2

#### MCC 1EE MARFOREUR

SSGT	4961N	CONTRACTING CHIEF	0268	M	1
				Total	1

#### MCC 1GA Blt Is. CMD

SGT	7010D	PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST	014A	M	1
				Total	1

#### MCC 1GH MARFORRES

MSGT	7900	PROCUREMENT CHIEF	1013	M	1
GYSGT	7900	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	1015	M	2
SSGT	7900	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	1015A	M	0
SSGT	7900	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	1016	R	1
SGT	7900	PURCHASING SPECIALIST	1017	M	3
				Total	7

#### MCC 233 MBrks 8th&I

GYSGT	5141	PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN	0078	M	1
SGT	5141	PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN	0080	M	1
				Total	2

#### MCC G78 MATSG Pensacola

SSGT	8221A	PURCHASING NCOIC	0354	M	1
				Total	1

#### MCC H65 NJROTC, Memphis TN

GYSGT	-----	PURCHASING NCOIC	-----	M	1
				Total	1

#### MCC L9M Orlando

SSGT	4958	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	0169	M	1
				Total	1

#### MCC LA9 MCSA KC

MSGT	5133A	HEAD CONTRACTING CHIEF	0104	M	1
------	-------	------------------------	------	---	---

Command					Current T/O
MCC	T/O	Billet Description	L/N	BRN	Structure
SSGT	5133A	CONTRACT SPECIALIST(AR)	0105	R	1
Total					2
<b>MCC TP6 CBIRF</b>					
GYSGT	4958	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	0169	M	1
Total					1
<b>MCC W25 MCSA KC</b>					
GYSGT	5133A	CONTRACTING SPECIALIST	0785G	M	1
Total					1
Field Total					116

## APPENDIX C. AIR FORCE CONTRACTING UNIT TYPE CODES

### Mission Capability Statement

#### **XFFK1: CON CONTRACT LARGE AV SPT IND**

THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT (SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (OPS), COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPS WITH A POPULATION SIZE UP TO 1000 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 1000, FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE. THE ADVON TEAM MUST INCLUDE AN APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED MEMBER ALONG WITH A DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). THIS UTC INCLUDES THE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFK4. CONTRACTING MEMBERS MAY HANDCARRY LAPTOP COMPUTERS INCLUDED IN THE XFFK4. ONE MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED, TWO MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I CERTIFIED, AND THE REMAINING MEMBER MUST BE A PRIMARY 5-SKILL LEVEL. THE 64P3 POSITION, MAY BE SUBSTITUTED WITH NO LESS THAN A 6C071, LEVEL II. THE 6C051, CONTRACTING JOURNEYMAN, POSITION MAY BE SUBSTITUTED WITH A 64P3, LEVEL I. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. ALL CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting	064P3	03/02	1
Contracting Craftsman	6C071		1
Contracting Journeyman	6C051		2
<u>EQUIPMENT PACKAGE</u>	<u>UTC</u>	<u>SUPPLIES</u>	<u>WEIGHT</u>
	XFFK4		MS/T 0.2

#### **XFFK2: CON CONTRACT MEDIUM AV SPT IND**

THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT (SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPS WITH A POPULATION SIZE UP TO 500 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 500, FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE. THE ADVON TEAM MUST INCLUDE AN APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED MEMBER ALONG WITH A DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT PER MEMBER. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBERS MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. ONE MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED. THE SECOND MEMBER MUST BE A PRIMARY 5-SKILL

LEVEL. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. ALL CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting Craftsman	6C071		1
Contracting Journeyman	6C051		1

**XFFK3: CON CONTRACT OFFICER AV SPT DEP**

THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT (SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPERATIONS WITH A POPULATION SIZE UP TO 250 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 250, FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE. THE ADVON TEAM MUST INCLUDE THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL ALONG WITH THE DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting	064P3	03/02	1

**XFFK4: CON CONTRACTING LARGE EQUIP KIT**

THIS UTC PROVIDES EQUIPMENT OUTLINED IN THE AIR FORCE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT (AFFARS) APPENDIX CC/CONTINGENCY OPERATIONAL CONTRACTING SUPPORT PROGRAM.

**XFFK5: CON CONTRACT 5 LVL AUG SUPT DEP**

THIS DEPENDENT (DEP) UTC IS USED TO AUGMENT THE XFFK1/2/3/7/9 IF THE POPULATION SIZE AT A PARTICULAR LOCATION INCREASES BY 250 PERSONNEL. THIS UTC MAY ALSO BE USED TO CONFRONT FORCE PROTECTION OR GEOGRAPHICAL CONCERNS WHERE CCOs HAVE TO TRAVEL OFF BASE IN PAIRS. CONTRACTING MEMBERS MUST BE AT LEAST A PRIMARY 5-SKILL LEVEL. ONE MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I CERTIFIED. THERE IS NO CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENT FOR THE SECOND MEMBER. THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT PER MEMBER. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBERS MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE

CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. ALL CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting Journeyman	6C051		2

**XFFK6: CON CONTRACTING OFFICE CHIEF**

THIS DEPENDENT UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT TO A UNIFIED COMPONENT COMMAND CONTRACTING STAFF AS REQUESTED BY THE HEAD OF THE CONTRACTING ACTIVITY OF THE AIR COMPONENT. THIS UTC ALSO PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPERVISION FOR AF OR JOINT CONTRACTING OPERATIONS. THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED. THE M9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting	064P3	04	1

**XFFK7: CON CONTRACT SMALL AV SPT IND**

THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT (SPT) FOR AVIATION (AV) SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN AND NEO OPERATIONS WITH A POPULATION SIZE UP TO 250 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 250, FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE. THE ADVON TEAM MUST INCLUDE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL ALONG WITH A DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL II CERTIFIED. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting Craftsman	6C071		1

**XFFK8: CON CONTRACTING JOURNEYMAN DEP**

THIS DEPENDENT (DEP) UTC IS USED TO AUGMENT THE XFFK1/2/3/7/9 IF THE POPULATION SIZE AT A PARTICULAR LOCATION INCREASES BY 250 PERSONNEL. THIS UTC MAY ALSO BE USED TO



CONFRONT FORCE PROTECTION OR GEOGRAPHICAL CONCERNS WHERE MEMBERS HAVE TO TRAVEL OFF BASE IN PAIRS. MEMBER MUST BE A PRIMARY 5-SKILL LEVEL. APDP CERTIFICATION IS NOT REQUIRED. THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBER MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting Journeyman	6C051		1

**XFFK9: CON CONTRACTING JOURNEYMAN IND**

THIS INDEPENDENT (IND) UTC PROVIDES CONTRACTING SUPPORT FOR AVIATION SQUADRONS, SMALL-SCALE CONTINGENCIES, COUNTER DRUGS OPS, HUMANITARIAN OPS, AND NEO DURING DEPLOYMENTS WITH A POPULATION SIZE UP TO 250 PERSONNEL. ADDITIONAL CONTRACTING UTC PACKAGES MAY BE REQUIRED WHEN POPULATION EXCEEDS 250, FOR FORCE PROTECTION CONCERNS, DEPLOYMENT COMPLEXITY, OR AS GEOGRAPHICAL LIMITATIONS NECESSITATE. THE ADVON TEAM MUST INCLUDE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL ALONG WITH A DISBURSING AGENT (XFFA1, XFFA2, OR XFFA5, AS APPROPRIATE). MEMBER MUST BE APDP CON LEVEL I CERTIFIED. THIS UTC MAY BE SUPPLEMENTED WITH ONE EQUIPMENT UTC XFFKT. WHEN THE XFFKT IS TASKED, CONTRACTING MEMBERS MAY HANDCARRY THE LAPTOP. THE M-9 IS THE PRIMARY WEAPON FOR THE CONTRACTING PERSONNEL. EXCESS BAGGAGE IS AUTHORIZED. CONTRACTING PERSONNEL WILL DEPLOY WITH A WARRANT.

<u>POSITION</u>	<u>AFSC</u>	<u>GRADE</u>	<u>QUANTITY</u>
Contracting Journeyman	6C051	<u>Y</u>	1

**XFFKT: CON CONTRACT SMALL EQUIP KIT**

THIS UTC PROVIDES EQUIPMENT OUTLINED IN THE AIR FORCE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION SUPPLEMENT (AFFARS) APPENDIX CC/CONTINGENCY OPERATIONAL CONTRACTING SUPPORT PROGRAM.

**XFFKA: CON CONTRACTING SUPPORT MIL**

THERE IS NO OFFICIAL MISCAP. THIS IS A NON-DEPLOYABLE UTC FOR PERSONNEL IN A UNIT CONSIDERED IN-PLACE TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS. THIS UTC IS FOR ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL IN A UNIT ON TRAINING STATUS: 64P1 and 6C031. THIS COULD ALSO INCLUDE ANY OTHER MILITARY PERSONNEL ON PROFILE OR NOT ON A NORMAL DEPLOYABLE UTC.

**XFFKC: CON CONTRACTING SUPPORT CIV**

THERE IS NO OFFICIAL MISCAP. THIS IS A NON-DEPLOYABLE UTC.  
THIS UTC IS FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL IN A UNIT CONSIDERED IN-PLACE  
TO SUPPORT OPERATIONS.

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## APPENDIX D. 3044 SURVEY QUESTIONS



Official Survey  
Naval Postgraduate School  
Office of Academic Administration  
Monterey, CA 93943

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### MOS 3044 Survey

This survey is being conducted in conjunction with initiatives at Headquarters Marine Corps I & L Contracts Division, Community Management Team and MOS Sponsor to improve the career development of Marines assigned to the 3044 MOS. Your answers will be used to identify recommendations designed to improve your education, training, and promotion opportunities. The combined survey results and report recommendations will be forwarded to HQMC LB for future consideration. Your survey information may very well benefit your future!

Your responses to this survey are **ANONYMOUS**. The web based program you are using to input your responses will only provide the researcher with the aggregate responses to each question. The program will not associate your responses to your name in any way.

Answer the questions as accurately and completely as possible. Questions that ask you to type in a response have a limited amount of space for your answer. Please do your best to fit your answer into the space provided. Short bullet-type answers work best, but feel free to fill the allotted space.

If you have questions about the survey, or would like to elaborate on a particular question(s), that cannot be included in the space provided, please send an e-mail to the researcher at: <mailto:jhmorri1@nps.navy.mil>

## DEMOGRAPHICS

### 1. What is your current Rank?

- ☐ E-1
- ☐ E-2
- ☐ E-3
- ☐ E-4
- ☐ E-5
- ☐ E-6
- ☐ E-7
- ☐ E-8
- ☐ E-9

### 2. From the list below, Which type of command best identifies the one you are currently assigned to? If none of the selections are appropriate please select other.


- ☐ HQ -LB
- ☐ Quantico
- ☐ MCB Camp Lejeune
- ☐ MCB Camp Pendelton
- ☐ MCRD
- ☐ MCLB Barstow
- ☐ MCAS Cherry Point
- ☐ MCAS Miramar
- ☐ MCB Camp Butler
- ☐ MARFOR -LANT/PAC

- ☐ MARFOR - UER/SOU
- ☐ MARFORRES
- ☐ 1st FSSG
- ☐ 2nd FSSG
- ☐ 3rd FSSG
- ☐ Other

**3. Is your current rank adequate for the performance of your duties?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**4. If your answer to Question #3 was "No", please explain briefly why your answer was "No".**



**5. What was your MOS prior to attaining the 3044 MOS?**

- ☐ Administration
- ☐ Logistics
- ☐ Supply
- ☐ Other

**6. How long have you been in the 3044 MOS (including your OJT time)?**

- ☐ Less than 1 year
- ☐ 1-2 years
- ☐ 3-5 years

- ☐ 6-8 years
- ☐ 9-11 years
- ☐ 12-14 years
- ☐ 15-17 years
- ☐ 17-19 years
- ☐ 20 years or greater


**7. What DAWIA Certification Level (in the contracting field) do you currently hold?**

- ☐ Level I
- ☐ Level II
- ☐ Level III

**8. What DAWIA Certification Level does your current billet require?**

- ☐ Level I
- ☐ Level II
- ☐ Level III

**9. What difficulties have you experienced when trying to attain your certification level?**



**10. Are you currently assigned to a base or a contingency contracting billet?**

- ☐ Base contracting billet
- ☐ Contingency contracting billet

**11. Have you completed a tour in a "B" billet (Recruiting, Drill Instructor, Security Forces, etc.) after receiving the 3044 MOS?**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**12. Have you completed a tour on the SNCO Degree Completion Program after receiving the 3044 MOS?**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**13. If you have completed a tour in a "B" billet or the SNCO Degree Completion Program (answered "Yes" to question #11 or #12), what difficulties did you experience upon returning to the 3044 MOS? Briefly explain below.**

#### **TRAINING**

**14. How long were you in an On the Job Training (OJT) status?**

☐ 1 month

☐ 2 months

☐ 3 months

☐ 4 months

☐ 5 months

☐ 6 months

☐ 7 months






☐ 8 months

☐ 9 months








 10 months or more






**15. What was your first duty assignment following the completion of your OJT period? Briefly describe.**






**16. What DAU courses were you able to attend during your OJT period? List only those courses attended during the OJT period.**

**17. What difficulties did you experience trying to attend DAU courses during your OJT period? Briefly list the course(s) and the difficulties you experienced during your OJT period only (i.e., lack of funding, family commitments, guard duty, etc.)**

**18. What difficulties have you experienced trying to attend DAU courses after your OJT period? Briefly list the course(s) and the difficulties you experienced.**

**19. Have you been able to achieve the 80 hours of continuous learning required during the last 2-year period ending 30 September 2002?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**20. If you have NOT been able to meet the 80 hours of continuous learning within the 2 year time period, briefly describe the difficulties you have encountered.**

**21. Does your contracting office/unit/section have an annual training plan?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**22. If your office/unit/section DOES have an annual training plan, briefly describe the kinds of contracting related training it contains.**

## EDUCATION

**23. From the choices below select the highest degree you currently posses?**

- ☐ High School Diploma or equivalent
- ☐ Associate Degree
- ☐ Baccalaureate Degree
- ☐ Masters Degree or higher

**24. Do you meet the minimum 24 semester credit hours of business related courses required under Section 824 of the Defense Authorization Act of 2002?**

- ☐ Yes
- ☐ No

**25. If you DO NOT meet the 24 semester credit hours of business courses, how many business related college credits did you have prior to entering the MOS? (select closest number)**

- ☐ 0
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 6
- ☐ 9
- ☐ 12
- ☐ 15
- ☐ 18
- ☐ 21
- ☐ 24

**26. If you DO NOT meet the 24 semester credit hours of business courses, how many business related credits have you been able to acquire after entering the MOS? (select closest number)**

- ☐ 0
- ☐ 3
- ☐ 6
- ☐ 9
- ☐ 12
- ☐ 15
- ☐ 18
- ☐ 21
- ☐ 24

**27. Do you attend business related college courses during the workday?**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**28. What problems have you encountered when trying to attend college courses after you entered the MOS? (i.e., deployments, long work hours, courses not available, etc.)**

**29. How do you think your education opportunities can be improved?**

#### **CONTINGENCY CONTRACTING EXPERIENCE**

**30. Have you had an opportunity to serve in a contingency contracting billet?**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**31. If you have NOT been able to serve in a contingency contracting billet, what has prevented you from serving in a contingency billet? (i.e., lack of certification, personal preference, etc.)**

**32. If you have not had the opportunity to serve in a contingency billet, do you feel you are less competitive for promotion?**

☐ Yes

☐ No

**33. How many TOURS have you completed in contingency contracting billets? (PCS assignments not temporary deployments)**

☐ 0

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4

☐ 5 or more

**34. During your MOST RECENT contingency contracting tour ONLY, How many contingency or training deployments have you participated in that required you to perform your contingency contracting mission?**

☐ 0

☐ 1

☐ 2

☐ 3

☐ 4

☐ 5

☐ 6

☐ 7

☐ 8 or more

**35. During ALL contingency contracting tours PRIOR to your most recent contingency contracting tour, how many contingency or training operations have**

**you participated in?**

-  0  
 1  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 10 or more

**36. If you were issued any waivers to be able to deploy, such as a waiver for your certification level, briefly explain or put NA if this question does not apply.**

[illegible]

**37. Have you participated in operations or exercises where you had the opportunity to work with enlisted contingency contracting personnel from other services?**

- ☒ Yes
- ☐ No

38. If you HAVE had the opportunity to observe enlisted contingency contracting personnel from other services, how would you rate their training compared to the training you received?

-  Better

- ☐ Worse
- ☐ Same
- ☐ Not applicable

**39. If you HAVE had the opportunity to observe enlisted contingency contracting personnel from other services, how would you rate their education opportunities compared with your education opportunities?**

- ☐ Better
- ☐ Worse
- ☐ Same
- ☐ Not applicable

**40. How do you think the Marine Corps contingency contracting process can be improved?**

#### **FUTURE INTENTIONS**

**41. Do you plan to get your Associates or Baccalaureate degree while on active duty?**

- ☐ Associates
- ☐ Baccalaureate
- ☐ No

**42. Once you attain your desired degree, do you plan to remain on active duty or seek employment in the civilian market?**

- ☐ Remain on active duty
- ☐ Seek civilian employment
- ☐ Undecided

☐ Federal Civil Service

**43. If you plan to depart active duty, select all of the following that would be an attractive incentive to keep you on active duty?**

- ☐ Higher retention bonus
- ☐ Contracting Warrant Officer Program
- ☐ Selection for a commissioned officer program
- ☐ Faster promotions
- ☐ More responsibility
- ☐ Does not apply (plan to retire)

**44. What changes in the 3044 MOS do you recommend?**



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Office of Academic Administration, Gary Dent, 656-2479 [gdent@nps.navy.mil](mailto:gdent@nps.navy.mil)



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